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About the Journal

Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes is an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed journal devoted to original scholarship that illuminates any and all aspects of the Canadian Jewish experience. It is published annually since 1993 and twice annually since 2019 by the Association for Canadian Jewish Studies / l'Association d'études juives canadiennes (ACJS / Aéjc).

Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes is edited by Dr. David S. Koffman; its managing editor is Joshua Tapper. Dr. Amir Lavie and Valentina Gaddi are associate editors. Vardit Lightstone serves as the English-language book review editor, and Janice Rosen is editor of "Archives Matter."

Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes publishes research in English and French in the disciplines of history, political science, sociology, economics, geography, demography, education, religion, linguistics, literature architecture, performing arts, and fine arts, among others. The "Archives Matter" section features short articles about the study of Canadian Jewry using archival resources and collections throughout the country. The "Translation" section offers recent translations into English or French of texts originally written in other languages, and which are pertinent to Canadian Jewish studies and research. The journal also regularly features a section called "Reflections," comprised of short essays by senior scholars in the field. *Canadian Jewish Studies* also publishes scholarly book reviews in English and French. We welcome authors to enrich their articles with multimedia content such as video, audio, and digital art that can be published in the online version of the journal.

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À propos de la Revue

Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes est une revue interdisciplinaire, évaluée par un comité de lecture et consacrée à la publication de travaux scientifiques originaux portant sur tous les aspects de l'expérience juive canadienne. Elle est publiée annuellement depuis 1993 par l'Association for Canadian Jewish Studies / Association d'études juives canadiennes (ACJS-AÉJC) et biannuellement depuis 2019.

Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes est actuellement dirigée par David Koffman (rédacteur en chef) et Joshua Tapper (rédacteur adjoint). Amir Lavie et Valentina Gaddi sont éditeur et éditrice associés. Vardit Lightstone est l'éditrice des comptes rendus en anglais et Janice Rosen est la rédactrice du segment « À vos archives! ».

Études juives canadiennes publie des articles en anglais et en français dans des domaines tels que l'histoire, la science politique, la sociologie, l'économie, la géographie, la démographie, l'éducation, la religion, la linguistique, la littérature et l'architecture, les arts du spectacle et les beaux-arts. La section « À nos archives! » comprend des courts articles portant sur la judéité canadienne, présentant des ressources d'archive et des collections à travers le pays. La section « Traduction » offre des traductions en anglais ou en français de textes pertinents pour les études juives canadiennes écrits dans d'autres langues. La revue tient aussi désormais régulièrement une section intitulée « Réflexions », où l'on peut retrouver de court essais rédigés par des chercheur.e.s senior. Études juives canadiennes publie finalement des comptes-rendus d'ouvrages. Nous invitons les auteur.e.s à accompagner leur article de contenu multimédia (vidéo, audio, art numérique, etc.) qui pourra être publié dans la version en ligne de la revue.

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Volume 37 Editors' Foreword

Our double-chai volume, scheduled for mid-October 2023, was not published until early days of January 2024. The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and the ensuing war devoured our focus and attention, as it did the energies of virtually the entire Jewish world. In the editors' foreword to that volume we wrote in November, we announced our intention that the pages of this journal might soon be able to offer some scholarly reflection on how the conflict and the conflict over the conflict was taking shape and impacting Canadian Jewish life. "Time will tell exactly how much will change, and what will remain the same both there and here," we wrote. "And, in the fullness of time, we hope that this journal will be able to provide some space for scholarly insight about the ways the unfolding Israel-Hamas war impacts Canadian Jewish life."

Weeks later, we can now present at least one meaningful, timely, scholarly contribution: Robert Brym's survey, captured throughout February 2024, of a representative sample of 2,857 Canadian respondents' attitudes toward Jews and Israel, and his analysis of harmonies and dissonances between them and Jewish Canadians' perceptions of antisemitism and Israel. Compiled during a time of war, in a highly polarized information landscape, Brym's survey reveals that while Canadian Jews feel threatened amid a surge in anti-Israel sentiment, most non-Jewish Canadians look positively at their Jewish neighbours. In one of his more remarkable findings, Brym also shows that the Israel-Hamas war, coupled with the Israeli government's sustained shift to the right, seems to have eroded Canadian Jews' emotional attachment to Israel.

We believe it is essential for Canadians, for Canadian Jews, for policy makers, journalists, interested observers, and for those scholars and leaders who share our concern to understand the experiences and fates of Canadian Jews to have available the cleanest social research—and the rawest data—on these questions as possible. Brym's survey and report, published here, represents the first and only such social science finding about our current moment that meets professional sociological research standards. The editorial team ushered his initial submission through a more rigorous peer-review process than usual. No less than five social scientists, from a range of backgrounds and with a range of adjacent areas of expertise, offered comments and recommendations. The survey, conducted by one of Canada's leading sociologists, is the sole contribution to Volume 37—a bonus volume we recognize is urgent enough to publish as a stand-alone report. *Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes* will publish two additional volumes in the calendar year 2024.

We extend our sincere thanks to our peer-reviewers, who graciously agreed not only to review a much longer than typical article but were willing to review it on a very short timeline, so that we could make this research accessible as soon as possible. We also extend our sincere thanks to all those parties who helped fast-track this volume.

David S. Koffman
Editor-in-Chief

Joshua Tapper
Managing Editor

March 2024

Volume 37 Avant-propos des rédacteurs

Notre volume double-chai prévu pour la mi-octobre 2023, n'a été publié qu'en début janvier 2024. L'attaque du Hamas contre Israël le 7 octobre 2023 et la guerre qui a suivi ont capturé toute notre attention, ainsi que celle du monde juif en général. Dans l'avant-propos de ce volume, nous avons annoncé notre intention d'offrir bientôt à notre public une réflexion scientifique sur la façon dont le conflit et les débats sur le conflit se configurent et impactent la vie juive canadienne. « Le temps nous dira exactement ce qui changera et ce qui restera le même, ici et là-bas », nous avons écrit. « Avec le temps, nous souhaitons également que cette revue soit en mesure de fournir un espace de réflexion scientifique sur l'impact de la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas sur la vie juive canadienne. »

Quelques semaines plus tard, nous pouvons maintenant présenter au moins une contribution scientifique significative et d'actualité : le sondage de Robert Brym, réalisé pendant le mois de février 2024 auprès d'un échantillon représentatif de 2857 répondant.e.s canadien.ne.s, au sujet des attitudes envers les personnes juives et Israël, son analyse des consonances et des dissonances entre ces deux pôles, et les perceptions des Juif.ve.s canadien.ne.s à l'égard de l'antisémitisme et d'Israël. Réalisée en temps de guerre, dans un espace public très polarisé, l'enquête de Brym révèle que même si les Juif.ve.s canadien.ne.s se sentent menacé.e.s dans un contexte de la montée du sentiment anti-israélien, la plupart des Canadien.ne.s non juif.ve.s regardent positivement leurs voisin.e.s juif.ve.s. Dans l'une de ses découvertes les plus remarquables, Brym montre également que la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas, couplée au virage à droite du gouvernement israélien, semble avoir érodé l'attachement émotionnel des Juif.ve.s canadien.ne.s envers Israël.

Nous croyons qu'il est essentiel pour le public d'avoir accès à des recherches scientifiques rigoureuses et empiriquement fondées, d'autant plus en ce moment. Cette publication s'adresse donc aux personnes non juives et juives canadiennes, aux journalistes et aux universitaires, ainsi qu'aux leaders politiques et aux citoyen.ne.s ordinaires, qui, comme nous, souhaitent comprendre les expériences des personnes juives au Canada. Le sondage et le rapport de Brym, que nous publions ici, représentent actuellement la première et l'unique contribution en sciences sociales sur le sujet à propos de ce moment qui répond aux normes professionnelles de la recherche sociologique. Considérant le climat actuel, l'équipe éditoriale a soumis cette contribution à un processus d'évaluation par les pairs plus rigoureux que d'habitude. Cinq spécialistes en sciences sociales, issu.e.s d'horizons disciplinaires multiples et possédant des domaines d'expertise variés, ont formulé leurs commentaires et recommandations. L'enquête, menée par l'un des plus éminents sociologues au Canada, est la seule contribution au volume 37 — un volume additionnel, que nous reconnaissons suffisamment urgent pour être publié de manière autonome. *Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes* publiera deux autres volumes au cours de

l'année 2024.

Finalement, nous adressons nos plus sincères remerciements aux spécialistes qui ont généreusement accepté d'évaluer un article beaucoup plus long que d'habitude, et ce dans un très court délai, afin de rendre cette recherche accessible le plus rapidement possible. Nous exprimons également notre reconnaissance à tous ceux et celles qui ont contribué à accélérer la réalisation de ce volume.

David S. Koffman
Rédacteur en chef

Joshua Tapper
Rédacteur adjoint

Mars 2024

Robert Brym

Jews and Israel 2024: A Survey of Canadian Attitudes and Jewish Perceptions

For Sophie, Molly, Andie, and Max

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Abstract

Most Canadian Jews feel unsafe and victimized. They perceive a rise in negative attitudes toward Jews in recent months and years. Most doubt the situation will improve. The main reason they feel this way is that extreme anti-Israel statements and actions have proliferated in recent months. Because support for the existence of a Jewish state in Israel is a central component of their identity, most Jews regard extreme anti-Israel statements and actions as a threat to their existence as Jews.

Most non-Jewish Canadians do not have negative toward Jews. However, non-Jewish university students, Quebecois, and especially Muslim Canadians tend to have significantly more negative attitudes towards Jews than does the non-Jewish population as a whole.

Non-Jewish Canadians' attitudes toward Israel tend to be significantly more negative than their attitudes toward Jews. The groups with the most negative attitudes toward Israel are, in order, Muslims, non-Jewish supporters of the New Democratic Party, and non-Jewish university students.

Among non-Jewish Canadians, the correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel is positive, statistically significant, and at the low end of moderate. This means that, although some critics of Israel have negative attitudes toward Jews, most do not. Exceptions include Muslims, who tend to score relatively high on negative attitudes toward Jews and Israel; and people who identify as hard right, supporters of the Conservative and People's Parties, and Canadians over the age of sixty-four, who tend to score relatively low on negative attitudes toward Jews and Israel.

On the whole, Canadian Jews have experienced a reduction in their emotional attachment to Israel because of the Israel-Hamas war and the rightward drift of Israeli government policy.

The trends just listed are derived from a survey conducted between 1 and 28 February 2024. The survey was based on four broadly representative independent samples of Canadian residents: 1,121 non-Jewish adults, 1,010 non-Jewish university students, 312 Muslim adults, and 414 Jewish adults, for a total of 2,857 respondents. In addition to providing an analysis of the survey results for the educated non-specialist public, this report seeks to place its findings in social context and in the context of prior survey research on attitudes toward Jews and Israel.

Résumé

La plupart des Juif.ve.s canadien.ne.s ne se sent pas en sécurité et partage le sentiment d'être des victimes. Ils et elles perçoivent une montée des attitudes négatives à l'égard des personnes juives au cours des derniers mois et années. La plupart doutent que la situation puisse s'améliorer, notamment en raison de la multiplication des déclarations et des actions extrémistes anti-israéliennes au cours de ces derniers mois. Le soutien à l'existence d'un État juif en Israël étant un élément central de leur identité, la plupart des Juif.ve.s considère ces déclarations et actions comme une menace pour leur existence en tant que personnes juives.

Une large partie de la population canadienne non juive n'a aucune attitude négative à l'égard des Juif.ve.s. Cependant, les étudiant.e.s universitaires non-juif.ve.s, les Québécois.e.s et surtout les Canadien.ne.s musulman.e.s ont tendance à avoir des attitudes nettement plus négatives envers les Juif.ve.s par rapport à la population non juive dans son ensemble.

Les attitudes des Canadien.ne.s non juif.ve.s envers Israël ont tendance à être nettement plus négatives que leurs attitudes envers les Juif.ve.s. Les groupes ayant les attitudes les plus négatives envers Israël sont, dans l'ordre, les Musulmans, les partisans non-juifs du Nouveau Parti démocratique, du Parti Vert et du Bloc québécois, ainsi que les étudiant.e.s universitaires non juif.ve.s.

Parmi les Canadien.ne.s non juif.ve.s, la corrélation entre les attitudes envers les Juif.ve.s et les attitudes envers Israël est positive, statistiquement significative et se situe dans la partie inférieure de la fourchette dite modérée. Cela signifie que, même si certaines personnes qui sont critiques à l'égard d'Israël ont des attitudes négatives à l'égard des Juif.ve.s, la plupart n'en ont pas. Les exceptions incluent les Musulman.e.s, qui ont tendance à afficher des attitudes négatives relativement élevées envers les Juif.ve.s et Israël ; les gens qui s'identifient comme étant d'extrême droite, tels que les partisans des partis conservateurs et populaires ; et les Canadien.ne.s âgés de plus de soixante-quatre ans, qui ont tendance à afficher des scores relativement faibles en termes d'attitudes négatives envers les Juifs et Israël.

Dans l'ensemble, l'attachement émotionnel des Juif.ve.s canadien.ne.s à l'égard d'Israël a diminué en raison de la guerre entre Israël et le Hamas et de la dérive vers la droite du gouvernement israélien.

Les tendances énoncées ci-dessus proviennent d'une enquête menée entre le 1^{er} et le 28 février 2024. L'enquête est basée sur quatre échantillons indépendants qui sont largement représentatifs de la population canadienne dans son ensemble : 1 121 adultes non juifs, 1 010 étudiant.e.s universitaires non juifs, 312 adultes musulmans et

414 adultes juifs, pour un total de 2 857 répondant.e.s. En plus de fournir une analyse des résultats de l'enquête à l'intention d'un public non spécialisé, ce rapport cherche à situer ses résultats dans le contexte social courant ainsi que par rapport aux enquêtes antérieures sur les attitudes envers les Juif.v.es et Israël.

Preface: The context and the study

The 1988 Hamas covenant states that the movement's aim is to replace Israel with a strict Muslim theocracy in the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and to kill Jews.¹ However, a public opinion poll conducted in March 2023 found that just one-third of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would support Hamas in a legislative election. A second poll conducted between 28 September and 8 October 2023 showed that, in a presidential election between Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas leader, and Marwan Barghouti, the most popular figure in Fatah, Haniyeh would receive 37 percent of the vote compared to 58 percent for Barghouti.² These figures show that a large minority of Palestinians in the occupied territories supported Hamas. They also indicate that a large majority of Palestinians in the occupied territories were not Hamas supporters when these surveys were conducted.

Similarly, at least one poll conducted shortly before the 7 October Hamas pogrom shows that most Israeli Jews were not keen on Israeli domination and annexation of the occupied territories. In September 2023, 30 percent of Israeli Jews said the next government should "strive to annex the West Bank and establish a single state with privileged status for Jews"—again, a large minority but far from all or even most of the population.³

Stereotypes that make compromise difficult reside at the extremes of public opinion on any controversial issue. If mere opinion gives way to violent conflict, stereotypes and extremist attitudes in general ensnare more people. Although most Palestinians and Israeli Jews did not take the most extreme positions in the conflict between the two peoples before 7 October 2023, it should astonish no one that extremism grew in the aftermath of the Hamas pogrom and Israel's consequent Gaza bombing campaign and massive ground incursion.

Thus, a poll conducted in late October and early November 2023 found that nearly six of ten Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza strongly supported the 7 October 2023 pogrom, while support for a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict had declined among more than two-thirds of respondents.⁴ Among Israeli Jews, support for a two-state solution dropped from about 48 percent in September 2023 to less than 29 percent in late October 2023—the lowest percentage since the second *intifada*.⁵ Conflict destroys empathy for opponents and effaces distinctions required to resolve disputes. It blurs the perception of differences between Jews in general and those Jews wanting to annex and dominate the occupied territories. It also blurs the perception of differences between Palestinians and Hamas supporters.

Our understanding of how these issues have played out in Canada has been forcefully but for the most part impressionistically expressed by many in the media and in everyday life. Census-based research on Canadian Jews, most of it authored by Charles Shahar, exists. However, there is more good survey research on attitudes toward the 1,300 Jews in Norway than on the 405,000 Jews in Canada. *Jews and Israel 2024: A Survey of Canadian Attitudes and Jewish Perceptions* helps to change this state of affairs. It addresses one part of the attitudinal universe sketched above, providing a benchmark study of non-Jewish Canadians' attitudes toward Jews and Israel.⁶ Separate samples of non-Jewish university students and of Muslim adults in the general population allow comparisons between these groups and all non-Jewish Canadian adults. Yet another sample of Jewish Canadian adults offers a window into how they perceive others' attitudes toward Jews and Israel.

It is based on broadly representative and independent samples of 1,121 non-Jewish adults residing in Canada (maximum margin of error, 2.9 percent, 19 times out of 20), 1,010 non-Jewish university students residing in Canada (maximum margin of error, 3.1 percent, 19 times out of 20), 312 Muslim adults residing in Canada (maximum margin of error, 5.6 percent, 19 times out of 20), and 414 Jewish adults residing in Canada (maximum margin of error, 4.8 percent, 19 times out of 20).⁷ Findings reach their maximum margin of error at 50 percent. The more findings exceed or subceed 50 percent, the smaller their margins of error.

Following what has come to be known as the "standard Canadian census definition of Jewish," I defined Jews for purposes of sampling as individuals who said they are Jewish by religion or said they have no religious identification but identify as Jewish by ethnicity.⁸

Samples were drawn from a large panel and weighted by known population characteristics: gender and region of residence for all four samples; age for all samples other than university students; field of study for university students; and educational attainment for the general population. The non-Jewish samples allow us to examine levels of sentiment toward Jews and Israel; the distribution of these sentiments in various categories of the population; and the correlation between the two sets of sentiments in different population groups. The Jewish sample allows us to examine what Jews believe others think of them and of Israel; the extent to which Jews believe the perceptions of others have changed and will change; and how safe Jews feel. Weighted sample characteristics will be found in the Appendix.

The survey's protocol was approved by the Social Sciences, Humanities, and Education Research Ethics Board of the University of Toronto (RIS Human Protocol Number 45102). EKOS Research Associates managed the survey.

I am grateful to Earl Washburn at EKOS for his efficiency, promptness, and expert advice and care. Jeffrey Kopstein, professor of political science and director of the Center for Jewish Studies at the University of California, Irvine, first suggested that I undertake a survey of Canadian university students and, for the present study, let me borrow several questions from a survey he conducted on US campuses. David Manchester, senior director of community data and research development for Jewish Federations of North America, graciously shared and allowed me to replicate some questions from his November 2023 *Jewish Community Understanding Survey* in the US. David Koffman, J. Richard Schiff Chair for the Study of Canadian Jewry and editor-in-chief of *Canadian Jewish Studies / Études juives canadiennes*, was eager to publish this report as a special issue of the journal. I very much appreciate his enthusiasm in this regard. I also thank Josh Tapper, CJS / EJC managing editor, for his impeccable assistance, and the five anonymous reviewers who David Koffman recruited. Their thoughtful critical comments on a draft, coming from different political perspectives and disciplines, helped to improve my work. However, because I initiated, designed, and funded the survey, and am the sole author of this report, I bear full responsibility for any shortcomings and errors that readers may find in the following pages.

This report is a summary of the survey intended for the educated public. To help tell its story, I provide brief summaries of the social context of the findings and the relevant literature and descriptive statistics summarizing the survey results. Technical issues are relegated to endnotes. More focused journal articles involving multivariate analysis for a professional social science audience will follow.

I believe that full disclosure involves sharing one's opinions openly and that judgments as to their validity should stand or fall based on evidence. I have not hesitated to follow these principles here. I expect that readers of different political persuasions will be pleased with some of my findings and displeased with others. I ask only that readers try to keep an open mind and recognize that, while survey research is not hard science, it offers a better opportunity to arrive at valid interpretations than preconceived notions do.

Like most surveys, this one captures an image of a single time period—February 2024, four months after the 7 October pogrom and once the death toll had reached about 1,400 Israelis and between 24,000 and 30,000 Palestinians.⁹ If it were conducted under conditions differing from those existing at the time of the survey, the findings would be different.

For example, under some circumstances, parties to a protracted and bitter conflict may come to realize that so much blood has been spilt on both sides that a new way must be sought.¹⁰ France and Germany were embattled since the six-

teenth century. It took World War II for them to become partners in the European Coal and Steel Community and, eventually, the European Union. Tragically, in 2024 the Israel–Palestine conflict is further removed than ever from a comparable outcome. One can only hope for, and work on behalf of, transformation of the current mass–casualty dispute over whose ox was gored to a time when both sides recognize the futility of violence and the other’s right to, and desperate need for, safety and sovereignty.

Robert Brym

Toronto

27 March 2024

I**Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism?**

The terms antisemitism and anti-Zionism are so encrusted with meanings it would take volumes to parse them.

In pre-state Israel, Zionism was propounded by a pro-capitalist party favouring the transformation of British Mandatory Palestine into a Jewish state by means of military force and Arab population transfer. Zionism was also advocated by a pro-socialist party supporting the formation of a single binational Jewish/Palestinian state by peaceful means. Between these two extremes we find a host of Zionisms—capitalist and socialist, religious and secular, hawkish and dovish, sympathetic and antipathetic to the creation of a separate Palestinian state.¹¹ If “anti-Zionism” is taken literally, it means opposition to all forms of Zionism, not all of which would be rejected by most Palestinians. That is why the phrase, “Zionism is racism,” expresses more rage than historical accuracy.

Meanwhile, anti-Zionism has been construed as inherently antisemitic by some observers (the so-called “new antisemitism”) and, by others, as conceptually distinct from antisemitism.¹² Inherent in the latter conceptualization is the implication that it is possible, at least in principle, to have positive attitudes toward Jews and oppose the existence of Israel as a Jewish state—or to be antisemitic and favour the existence of Israel as a Jewish state.

“Antisemitism” is also a murky notion. In recent decades some respected Jewish historians have questioned the degree to which particular statements, actions, and policies are or were antisemitic, even in interwar Poland. Some have abandoned the term “antisemitism” altogether on the grounds that we are unable to know the intent of many statements, actions, and policies that are typically classed as antisemitic.¹³

These complications notwithstanding, I tend to refer to antisemitism and anti-Zionism when discussing the works of researchers who have used these terms. However, in my own analysis, rather than sorting through the many meanings of antisemitism and anti-Zionism, then arguing for the superiority of one or another definition, I prefer to use more specific terminology. I analyze *attitudes toward Jews* and *attitudes toward Israel*. I also leave open the question of the correlation between the two sets of attitudes.¹⁴ Instead, I opt for an empirical approach. That is, I prefer to establish observable measures of attitudes toward Jews and toward Israel and of the correlation between the two. This method will likely not satisfy partisans of one definition or another, but I believe (and hope to show) that it yields fresh insight into the subject matter of this study.

2**Attitudes toward Jews**

2.1 Do Canadians really like Jews?

In late 2023 and early 2024, newspapers recounted a wave of assaults against Canadian Jews and their institutions. In Montreal, assailants fired gunshots at a yeshiva and threw a Molotov cocktail at a Jewish community centre. Anti-Jewish activists circulated a list of Jewish-owned businesses on TikTok, resulting in a wave of boycotts and vandalism. In Ottawa, the RCMP apprehended a teenager planning an armed attack on a Jewish target. Professors and students at the University of Victoria said they felt unsafe after multiple incidents of harassment and assault. In Toronto, demonstrators routinely blocked a bridge to a mainly Jewish neighbourhood and on one occasion closed off the entrance to Mount Sinai Hospital as they waved Palestinian flags and chanted support for an *intifada*. School boards in the Toronto area received multiple reports daily of children punching, spitting on, ostracizing, chasing, and hurling Nazi salutes and taunts such as “die in a gas chamber” at Jewish schoolmates.¹⁵ Even in Fredericton, New Brunswick, with a population of just 215 Jews by religion according to the 2021 census, vandals shattered the windows of Sgoolai Israel synagogue.

It was difficult to discern polite, multicultural, immigrant-friendly Canada behind this onslaught. Surveys in past years had found Canadians less likely than people in nearly all other countries to hold negative attitudes toward Jews. Were the surveys wrong? Did they in many cases tap responses demanded by the liberal norms of Canadian society rather than the malicious covert attitudes of numerous Canadians? Is the current survey likewise the victim of such gross distortion? For reasons I will now explain, that is unlikely.

2.2 Growing social cross-pressures may minimize the effect of social desirability on overt attitudes

In 2019 the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) polled nationally representative samples of adults in nineteen countries, including Canada. Respondents were classified as antisemitic if they agreed with six or more negative statements about Jews. Eight percent of Canadians were antisemitic by that measure. Only Sweden enjoyed a lower percentage of people classified as antisemitic.¹⁶ Consistent with this finding, a 2022 survey found that non-Jewish Canadians regard Judaism more highly than any other religion.¹⁷ Attitudinal data also suggest that the percentage of Canadians with negative attitudes toward Jews has been declining from the 1980s until 2019, the period for which relevant data are available.¹⁸

Should we take these surveys seriously? After all, in any survey of attitudes toward ethnic or religious minorities, respondents vary in the degree to which they truthfully report their sentiments. “Social desirability” influences responses, even when respondents are assured of anonymity. If lack of prejudice is highly normative in

society, prejudiced individuals taking a survey may be inclined to understate their prejudice. If prejudice becomes normative, social desirability may encourage unprejudiced survey respondents to conform by overstating their prejudices. (One can imagine how few respondents would have professed admiration for Jews in a survey conducted in Germany in 1944.) Nearly all attitudinal surveys measure overt attitudes, and this one is no different. Therefore, I cannot claim definitively that the present survey shows what respondents really think.

What I do know is that this survey was fielded at a time when socially desirable cross-pressures were pronounced. On the one hand, Canada has been an officially multicultural society since 1971. Respect for minority cultures has become a central feature of what it means to be Canadian for most residents of the country. For many residents, support for anti-racist policies has strengthened in the last decade or so, as universities, governments, and corporations have adopted Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) programs and championed a slate of ideological and policy objectives that they regard as progressive.

On the other hand, a growing number of Canadians perceive multiculturalism, EDI programs, and what is sometimes dubbed or derided as “wokeness” as economic or cultural threats. Those on the far right have become more outspoken against minority groups, Jews among them. At the same time, Jews have been largely excluded from EDI programs and some parts of the left because members of this camp perceive Jews as White and privileged.¹⁹ Anti-Jewish sentiment has thus grown on the left too. Nico Slobinsky, Pacific Region vice-president of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, exaggerated when he said that “we have seen the mainstreaming of antisemitism,” but it is undeniable that negative attitudes toward Jews are on the rise.²⁰

Attitudes towards Jews vary by age, religion, level of education, and other variables. However, *in the aggregate*, because of the cross-pressures just described, today’s overtly stated attitudes toward Jews may be closer to people’s real attitudes than skeptics believe. While some respondents may minimize the degree to which they state their prejudices openly, others may be emboldened to speak their mind or to state prejudices against Jews that were not front of mind just a decade or two ago. I believe that these cross-pressures help to minimize survey results that exaggerate positive, overt attitudes toward Jews.

2.3 Three reasons for the discrepancy between attitudinal and behavioural research findings

In contrast to attitudinal data, most behavioural data indicate a *rise* in antisemitic incidents in Canada over the past four decades, with an especially dramatic jump in

reported antisemitic incidents and hate crimes since the early 2000s. Jews reportedly experience more hate crimes than members of any other religious group.²¹ How can one account for the discrepancy between the findings of attitudinal and most behavioural research?

One reason for the discrepancy is that attitudinal and behavioural research measure different objects—*individuals* in the case of attitudinal research and *incidents* in the case of behavioural research. One individual may be responsible for many incidents. Over time, a relatively small number of Canadians harbouring anti-Jewish attitudes may more frequently express their attitudes in the form of online and offline slurs, vandalism, and interpersonal violence, all of which are recorded as antisemitic incidents. It is thus possible that there are more recorded antisemitic incidents today than in the recent past, not because there are more antisemitic individuals but because antisemitic individuals are more brazen. Said differently, a relatively small percentage of Canadians (counted by attitudinal surveys) may be responsible for a large percentage of incidents classified as antisemitic (picked up by hate crime statistics and the like).²²

A second reason for the discrepancy between attitudinal and behavioural research findings is that, in the latter case, the scope and methods of data collection have improved over time. Thus, the proportion of the Canadian population covered by police reports on hate crime increased from 87 percent to 99 percent between 2006 (the first year when hate crime data became available) and 2015. At the same time, police officers have been educated about and sensitized to the occurrence of hate crimes and so are more likely than they were in past years to classify certain crimes as motivated by hate. B'nai Brith Canada introduced a 24-hour telephone "anti-hate hotline" in 2001 and released an "anti-hate mobile app" a few years ago, making it easier to report antisemitic incidents. And especially since 2006, when Twitter went live, social media have offered increasingly easy access to ways of broadcasting antisemitic diatribes, made still easier when Elon Musk bought Twitter in 2022 and removed all limits on unregulated "free speech."²³ If you catch more fish using a bigger net with finer mesh, you would be wrong to conclude that the bounty is necessarily due to an increased quantity of fish in the sea. Similarly, it is likely that an unknown percentage of the rising number of antisemitic incidents recorded by the Canadian police and B'nai Brith Canada's annual audit is due to improved data collection and the inclusion of new data sources.²⁴

A third and final reason why behavioural data on antisemitic incidents may be somewhat misleading is that, over time, an increasing number of incidents categorized as antisemitic may be motivated wholly or in part by anti-Israel sentiment. Norwegian surveys conducted in 2011 and 2017 asked respondents who believed that antisemitism in that country is widespread, "What do you think is the reason for negative attitudes toward Jews?" The most frequent response in both years, among both Jewish

and non-Jewish respondents, referred to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as the main source of antisemitism.²⁵

Consistent with this view is the fact that a positive correlation exists between the outbreak of hostilities between Israelis and Palestinians and the number of incidents recorded as antisemitic. Between 2001 and 2014, each major Israeli military engagement against the Palestinians increased the likelihood of reported anti-Jewish hate crime in the US by an average of nearly 35 percent.²⁶ In Canada, spikes in anti-Jewish incidents including hate crimes are associated with military campaigns against Palestinians—and troughs are associated with the cessation of hostilities. A spike was thus recorded in Canada during the twelve-day “Guardian of the Walls” campaign (10–21 May 2021) in which 236 Palestinians were killed. The following year, the only Israeli military operation that took place was more short-lived and involved less Palestinian loss of life (38 deaths between 5 and 7 August). The number of Canadian acts of violence against Jews dropped by two-thirds.²⁷ Another cycle began on 7 October 2023, when Israel’s “Swords of Iron” campaign, aimed at eliminating Hamas, began. Compared to earlier campaigns, a much larger percentage of Palestinian casualties were civilians.²⁸ Montreal, Ottawa, and Toronto police reported a major spike in hate crimes against Jews that month. Between 7 October 2023 and 11 January 2024, anti-Jewish hate crimes in Toronto increased in frequency by 168 percent when compared to the same period in 2022–23. In Vancouver, more police-reported antisemitic incidents occurred between 7 October and 31 December 2023 than in all of 2022. Comparing 2022 and 2023, anti-Jewish hate crimes nearly doubled in Calgary and Edmonton and more than doubled in Halifax.²⁹ Based on past experience, one should expect a decline in the number of anti-Jewish hate crimes once the “Swords of Iron” campaign comes to an end.

None of these considerations permit the conclusion that anti-Jewish incidents have *not* increased in recent decades. However, the preceding discussion suggests that figures testifying to a steadily rising level of anti-Jewish behaviour over decades are likely inflated—by how much we don’t know.

The preceding discussion raises six questions pertinent to the current study:

1. What was the level of anti-Jewish sentiment in Canada in February 2024?
2. How did the level of anti-Jewish sentiment vary across different sections of Canadian society?
3. What was the level of anti-Israel sentiment in Canada in February 2024?
4. How did the level of anti-Israel sentiment vary across different sections of Canadian society?
5. What was the correlation between the level of anti-Jewish sentiment and the level of anti-Israel sentiment in February 2024?
6. How did the correlation vary across different sections of Canadian society?

The remainder of Chapter 2 of this report is devoted to answering questions 1 and 2. Chapter 3 seeks to answer questions 3 and 4. Chapter 4 focuses on questions 5 and 6.

2.4 Attitudes toward Jews in the 2024 survey

To measure attitudes toward Jews, I asked respondents whether they “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “slightly agree,” “agree,” or “strongly agree” with ten statements concerning Jews. Response options were coded 1 through 6, respectively. Respondents could also say they “don’t know” or refuse to respond to each statement (hereafter abbreviated as DK/NR). The question stem and the statements are as follows:

The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Jewish people. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of these statements.

1. *Jewish people should be admired for their resilience in the face of adversity.*
2. *Jewish people should be admired for their achievements despite discrimination against them.*
3. *Jewish people should be included in the policies that Canadian universities are implementing to increase equity, diversity, and inclusivity in all aspects of university life.*
4. *Jewish people in Canada are more loyal to Canada than to Israel.*
5. *Jewish people have too little influence over the media today.*
6. *Jewish people don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind.*
7. *It is appropriate for opponents of Israel’s policies to boycott Jewish-owned businesses in Canada.*
8. *Jewish people have too much power in our country today.*
9. *Jewish people talk too much about the Holocaust.*
10. *Jewish people are largely to blame for the negative consequences of globalization.*

I employed two tactics to minimize response bias. First, statements were alternatively worded to reflect positive and negative attitudes toward Jews. Second, for each statement, half the respondents were selected at random to see an “agree” response option first, while the other half saw a “disagree” response option first.

Table 2.1 summarizes responses to the ten statements for the sample of non-Jewish Canadian adults. Note that for eight of the ten statements (all but statements 4 and 5) an average of 20 percent of participants in the survey replied DK/NR. Some respondents may have genuinely felt that they did not have enough information to state an opinion regarding the statements. Others may have been reluctant to state an opinion. However, 20 percent DK/NR is not an unusual or unexpected result given the controversial nature of the statements, so these eight questions are retained for subsequent analysis.

Not so for statements 4 and 5. The fact that 45 to 52 percent of survey participants did not respond to these statements or replied DK/NR suggests yet another reason for the high percentage of DK/NR responses: some survey participants may have found the questions confusing. Therefore, these two statements have been dropped from subsequent analysis.

The survey yields the following results. Seventy-three percent of non-Jewish Canadian adults (89 percent of those with an opinion on the subject) agree that “Jewish people should be admired for their resilience in the face of adversity.”³⁰ Seventy-four percent (90 percent of those with an opinion) agree that “Jewish people should be admired for their achievements despite discrimination against them.” Fifty-eight percent (76 percent of those with an opinion) believe that “Jewish people should be included in the policies that Canadian universities are implementing to increase equity, diversity, and inclusivity in all aspects of university life.” These three questions, all positively worded, suggest that non-Jewish Canadian adults tend to have quite strong positive sentiments toward Jews.

Results for the five negatively worded statements yield somewhat fewer positive results, suggesting that, as always, question wording influences responses. By and large, however, the results reinforce my conclusion about the sentiments of non-Jewish Canadians toward Jews: very large percentages of non-Jewish Canadian adults disagree with the negatively worded statements.


Specifically, when presented with the statement that “Jewish people don’t care what happens to anyone but their own kind,” 68 percent of survey participants (82 percent of those with an opinion) disagree. Similarly, 67 percent of respondents (81 percent of those with an opinion) disagree that “it is appropriate for opponents of Israel’s policies to boycott Jewish-owned businesses in Canada.” When asked to consider whether “Jewish people have too much power in our country today,” 64 percent (83 percent of those with an opinion) disagree. And when asked whether “Jewish people talk too much about the Holocaust,” 68 percent (84 percent of those with an opinion) disagree. Finally, when asked to consider the statement that “Jewish people are largely to blame for the negative consequences of globalization,” 76 percent (95 percent of respondents with an opinion on the matter) disagree.

I created a scale of attitudes toward Jews that combines scores on the eight statements selected for subsequent analysis.³¹ Low scores on the scale indicate more positive attitudes toward Jews. High scores indicate more negative attitudes. The scale ranges from a low of 1 to a high of 6.

The average score for the general Canadian population is 2.3. As Figure 2.1 shows, just over 64 percent of non-Jewish Canadian adults score in the bottom third of the

scale with a score of 1 or 2. About 19 percent score 3. And nearly 17 percent have the most negative attitudes toward Jews, with scores of 4, 5, or 6. Contrary to the picture painted by many media outlets, these results do not suggest that a wave of antisemitism has engulfed the general population.³²

Figure 2.1 Non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews



The scale distinguishes respondents with less negative attitudes toward Jews from respondents with more negative attitudes. It does not allow us to divine a point on the scale that distinguishes antisemites from others. Nor does the scale allow us to compare Canada at different times or with other countries. Such comparisons would require using the same scale at different times and in different places. The reality is that there are about as many scales of attitudes toward Jews as there are researchers interested in the subject. Despite these shortcomings, the scale does allow us to see how Canadians who hold more negative attitudes toward Jews differ from Canadians who hold less negative attitudes. These differences are the subject of the next section.

2.5 The social distribution of attitudes toward Jews

2.5.1 Recent survey research

Research suggests that four groups may be especially prone to harbouring negative attitudes toward Jews: political extremists on the left and the right, young people (especially university students), Muslims, and, in Canada, the Quebecois. To provide useful context for the following analysis, I will now briefly summarize relevant findings from surveys conducted in the past decade on the distribution of anti-Jewish attitudes in national populations. Note that all the surveys mentioned below were fielded before the 2023–24 Israel–Hamas war.

US surveys show that propensity to agree with negative statements about Jews increases as one moves from older to younger age cohorts and from the left to the right of the ideological spectrum. Self-identified socialists are more likely than others on the left to have negative attitudes towards Jews, but individuals on the left are considerably less likely to have negative attitudes toward Jews than are individuals on the right. On average, Muslims are somewhat more likely than non-Muslims to agree with negative statements about Jews. The percentage of Muslims among the most extreme antisemites is considerably higher than the corresponding percentage of non-Muslims.³³

In the UK, findings on the association between political ideology and antisemitism are much the same as those in the US. Negative attitudes toward Jews are more frequent on the right than on the left. And as in the US, “very left-wing” individuals are more likely to have negative attitudes toward Jews than do others on the left. However, unlike the US, where the Muslim/non-Muslim difference is not large, Muslims in the UK are more than twice as likely as non-Muslims to have anti-Jewish attitudes. A more dramatic difference is that, while younger people in the US are more likely than older people to have anti-Jewish attitudes, the opposite is true in the UK.³⁴

A survey of twenty Western and Central European countries finds the now-familiar ideological gradient, with negative attitudes increasing as one moves from the left to the right of the political spectrum and a tendency for far-left individuals to be more negative than others on the left, though considerably less negative than those on the hard right. However, age is not associated with negative attitudes toward Jews across Europe. On average, Muslims are significantly more likely to be anti-Jewish than are non-Muslims, especially if they are very religious.³⁵

In Canada, multiple surveys and other data sources have found that, on average, Quebecois are more likely to express negative attitudes toward Jews than are non-Quebecois. For example, a 2019 survey found that negative feelings about Jews were more than twice as common in predominantly Roman Catholic French Quebec than in the rest of Canada, although some evidence also suggests that such feelings are waning in *la belle province*.³⁶

Although patterns of prejudice may have changed since the outbreak of the 2023–24 Israel–Hamas war, three cross-national patterns are evident from my cursory summary of recent survey research. First, the left–right gradient is similar across countries. Second, the association between age and having negative attitudes toward Jews differs across countries. Third, Muslims seem to be significantly more anti-Jewish than non-Muslims in Europe but less so in the US. Bearing these generalizations in mind, what can be said about Canada today regarding the social distribution of attitudes toward Jews?

Still, the findings for the two groups are dramatically different. Muslim Canadians take a much dimmer view of Jews than do members of the general non-Jewish population. For example, while 89 percent of non-Jewish Canadian adults with an opinion on the subject agree that “Jewish people should be admired for their resilience in the face of adversity,” the comparable figure for Muslim Canadian adults is 61 percent.

Differences between Muslims and the general non-Jewish population are larger for negatively worded statements than for positively worded statements. Thus, 81 percent of non-Jewish Canadian adults with an opinion on the subject disagree with the view that “[i]t is appropriate for opponents of Israel’s policies to boycott Jewish-owned businesses in Canada.” The figure for Muslim Canadians is 44 percent. Forty-eight percent of Muslim Canadian adults with an opinion agree that “Jewish people are largely to blame for the negative consequences of globalization,” but a mere 5 percent of non-Jews in the general population with an opinion endorse that conspiracy theory. And for those with an opinion there is a 49 percentage point difference regarding the statement that “Jewish people have too much power in our country today;” 83 percent of non-Jewish members of the general Canadian population disagree with that statement, compared to just 34 percent of Muslim Canadians.

On the 6-point scale of attitudes towards Jews introduced earlier, the mean score for Muslim adults is 3.7 compared to 2.3 for all non-Jewish Canadians. This sample difference is statistically significant at a very high level. The probability that it exists in the population is greater than 99.9 percent.³⁷

Unfortunately, because Canadians were not similarly surveyed about their attitudes toward Jews before and after the outbreak of the 2023–24 Israel–Hamas war, one cannot know how much of the observed differences between Muslims and the general population existed before hostilities began and how much developed in the course of the war. However, my impressions, based partly on the foregoing analysis and partly on witnessing protests on several university campuses and scanning news reports in the daily press and on television, are twofold.

First, Muslim Canadians are much more likely than are all Canadians to have negative opinions of Jews. Second, Muslim/non-Muslim differences in attitudes toward Jews likely widened since the events of 7 October 2023. As they witnessed the mounting death toll among their co-religionists in Gaza and the West Bank, most of them non-combatants, many Muslim Canadians seem to have found it increasingly difficult to distinguish Jews from the current Israeli government and its supporters. As one researcher using German data found nearly a decade before the 2023–24 Israel–Hamas war, “critics of Israel who were not originally motivated by anti-Semitism are ... in danger of developing anti-Semitic prejudices.”³⁸

Although conflict in the Middle East is partly responsible for the recent rise in anti-Jewish sentiment, demographic and economic factors affecting Canada's Muslims, unexamined in the survey that is the subject of this report, also play a role and therefore deserve to be mentioned briefly in concluding this section.

Dividing Canada's population into religious groups, one finds that Jews have the highest annual income and the lowest poverty rate, while Muslims have the lowest annual income and the highest poverty rate.³⁹ One might think that this difference is at least partly a function of the fact that about 63 percent of Canada's Muslims are immigrants compared to around 30 percent of Canada's Jews. However, partly because of discrimination against Muslims in the labour market, there is little change in the relative economic position of the two groups if we compare only the non-immigrants among them.⁴⁰ It is also significant that the Jewish and Muslim populations of Canada are concentrated in the country's largest cities where real estate prices have soared in recent years, placing the dream of owning a house out of reach of many young people, especially, of course, those in less favourable economic circumstances, such as Muslims on average. And to top it off, Canada's Muslims are much younger than Canada's Jews. Forty-one percent of the country's Muslims, but just 28 percent of the country's Jews, are between the ages of zero and twenty-four. Twenty-six percent of Canada's Jews, but a mere 6 percent of Canada's Muslims, are sixty-five or older.⁴¹

A so-called "youth bulge" facing relative economic deprivation and circumscribed prospects for upward mobility is a recipe for unrest. Blaming advantaged groups for one's difficulties is common in such circumstances.⁴² These are precisely the background conditions in which many Canadian Muslims find themselves today. It is likely that these circumstances contribute to the relatively high level of negative sentiment towards Jews in Canada's Muslim population, even setting aside conflict in the Middle East.

2.5.3 Quebecois/non-Quebecois differences

Quebecois and non-Quebecois attitudes toward Jews also differ. Recall that a higher score on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Jews indicates a more negative attitude. The mean score for the general population is 2.3. For Quebecois respondents the mean score is 2.9. This sample difference is highly statistically significant. The probability that it exists in the population is greater than 99.9 percent.⁴³ The historical tendency for the Quebecois to have more negative attitudes toward Jews than other Canadians have may be waning, but the tendency is still evident in the results of this survey.

2.5.4 The political spectrum

One of the survey questions reads as follows: “People sometimes place political opinions on a left–right spectrum. How would you characterize your political opinions on this spectrum? Please use a scale from 1 ‘extremely left’ to 7 ‘extremely right,’ with the mid–point 4 meaning ‘in the centre.’” Unexpectedly, I failed to find an association between position on the left–right political spectrum and score on the 6–point scale of attitudes toward Jews. Said differently, comparing respondents who say they are on the left, in the centre, and on the right of the political spectrum, the data do not yield a statistically significant difference in attitudes toward Jews at conventional levels.

Respondents were also asked: “If a federal election were held tomorrow, which party would you vote for?” I placed Conservative and People’s Party supporters in one category, Liberal Party, Bloc Québécois, and Green Party supporters in a second category, and New Democratic Party supporters in a third category. This grouping corresponds to the common view (supported by much political science research) that these parties are located respectively on the right, centre–left, and left of the political spectrum. Again, I found no difference in the likelihood that respondents with low, moderate, and high scores on the 6–point scale of attitudes toward Jews favour particular political parties located at different points on the political spectrum.

The current survey cannot adequately explain why the association between political ideology and attitudes toward Jews does not reach statistical significance, as previous studies conducted in countries other than Canada have found. I can only speculate as to the reason for this unexpected finding: Earlier I suggested (and will later further substantiate) that the growth of negative sentiment toward Israel in the wake of the 2023–24 Israel–Hamas war may be responsible in part for the growth of negative sentiment toward Jews. To the degree that the strengthening of anti–Israel attitudes in the wake of recent hostilities between Israel and Hamas occurred disproportionately on the left of the political spectrum, it may be responsible for the weakening of an association between attitudes toward Jews and political ideology in Canada today.

2.5.5 The age gradient and university students

Canada follows the European pattern with respect to the age–related distribution of attitudes toward Jews. Unlike the US, the association between age and attitudes towards Jews is negligible.⁴⁴ That is, younger Canadians are no more likely than older Canadians to have negative attitudes toward Jews.


However, university students form a subset of younger Canadians; in 2022–23, 30 percent of Canadians between the ages of eighteen and twenty–four attended university.⁴⁵ Many observers argue that the harsh and apparently widespread criticism

of Israel issuing from university campuses these days is driven at least in part by the anti-Jewish attitudes of university students. According to some observers, Canadian universities have become “hate factories” and “hotbeds of antisemitism.”⁴⁶ The present survey’s sample of 1,010 Canadian university students speaks directly to this issue.

Non-Jewish university students scored 2.8 on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Jews. That is significantly higher than the score of 2.3 for non-Jewish adults in the general population, significantly lower than the score of 3.7 for Muslim Canadians, but not significantly different than the score of 2.9 for Quebecois (Figure 2.2).⁴⁷

The fact that, on average, non-Jewish university students have more negative attitudes toward Jews than do members of the general non-Jewish population belies the widespread view that higher education universally and necessarily increases tolerance of all ethnic, racial, religious, gender, sexual, and other minority groups.⁴⁸ In past decades, higher education probably had such an effect, but the present survey shows that, today, university education in this country is associated with elevated negative attitudes at least toward Jews.

Figure 2.2 Mean attitudes of five non-Jewish Canadian groups toward Jews



On the other hand, referring to Canadian universities as “hotbeds of antisemitism” and the like is hyperbolic. Canadian university students are diverse socially and politically. Some are apolitical. Some are moderate, others conservative. The fact that non-Jewish university students in Canada have about the same level of negative attitudes toward Jews as Quebecois puts things into more accurate perspective than does the view that our universities are “hate factories.”

The reason that some observers make inflated claims about the specifically anti-Jewish attitudes of Canadian university students seems to be that they base their judgments largely on the extreme anti-*Israel* proclamations and protests of a minority of students.

A 2024 report appears to have adopted this approach to grading Canada's fifty public universities on antisemitism.⁴⁹ The report assigned D and F grades to the University of Victoria, the University of British Columbia, the University of Lethbridge, the University of Toronto, York University, Toronto Metropolitan University (formerly Ryerson University), Queen's University, and Concordia University. Since just over 23 percent of the 1,010 non-Jewish university students in the present survey attend these nine universities, it is possible to compare their students' attitudes toward Jews with the attitudes of students in the 41 universities that received grades of A, B, and C in the report. This procedure tests the validity of the report's methodology.

The results of this exercise are straightforward. On the 6-point scale of anti-Jewish attitudes, non-Jewish students in the nine universities that were graded D and F on antisemitism scored 2.8, exactly the same as the non-Jewish students in the 41 universities that received grades of A, B, and C. Thus, the report fails to distinguish universities where anti-Jewish attitudes are widespread from those where such attitudes are more circumscribed.

In contrast, the report's grading schema distinguishes universities where anti-*Israel* attitudes are widespread from those where such attitudes are more circumscribed. On the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Israel, discussed later, students in the nine D and F universities score 4.0, while those in the A, B, and C universities score 3.8. This difference is not large. However, the higher score for D and F universities indicates significantly more negative attitudes toward Israel in those institutions.⁵⁰

The specifics of anti-Jewish sentiment among non-Jewish Canadian university students are set out in Table 2.3.

3

Attitudes toward Israel

3.1 Distinguishing anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes

When demonstrators brandish placards proclaiming “from the river to the sea,” they are expressing the wish to end Israel’s control of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. As to the fate of the seven million Jews residing in the area, their opinions are mixed. At one extreme are those who say that the imagined non-Zionist state should be replaced by a Muslim theocracy, with Jews compelled to convert, emigrate, or meet their maker. For them, strong negative attitudes toward Israel are matched by strong negative attitudes toward Jews. At the other extreme are those who say that the imagined non-Zionist state should be a democracy guaranteeing equal rights to all citizens. For them, strong negative attitudes toward Israel are not necessarily matched by strong negative attitudes toward Jews.

Many Jews nonetheless see members of the second group as antisemites. That is because the existence of a Jewish state is central to most Jews’ conception of what constitutes Jewishness.⁵¹ Some Jews (and non-Jews) go so far as to say that anti-Zionism is inherently antisemitic.

In contrast, I believe that the relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes is an empirical question, not an issue that can be decided by definitional fiat. As the preceding examples suggest, attitudes toward Jews and toward Israel may be strongly, moderately, or weakly associated—or not associated at all—depending on which group of Canadians are under examination.

To discover the social contexts that account for variation in the strength of the association between attitudes toward Jews and toward Israel, it is necessary to develop independent measures of anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes, then apply them to representative samples of the populations of interest. That is the procedure I began to follow in my discussion of Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews in Chapter 2. It is the procedure I continue to follow in this chapter, which is devoted to an analysis of Canadians’ attitudes toward Israel.

3.2 Measures of attitudes toward Israel

To measure attitudes toward Israel, I asked respondents whether they “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “slightly agree,” “agree,” or “strongly agree” with ten statements. These response options were coded 1 through 6, respectively. As was the case for the measurement of attitudes toward Jews, I employed two tactics to minimize response bias. First, the statements were alternatively worded to reflect positive and negative attitudes toward Israel. Second, it was randomly determined whether a respondent would be presented with a “disagree” or “agree” option first. Respondents could also say they “don’t know” or

refuse to answer (DK/NR). The question stem and the statements are as follows:

The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Israel. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of these statements.

1. *The war Israel is conducting in Gaza is an example of genocide.*
2. *Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East.*
3. *Israel is an apartheid state.*
4. *There is no justification for Palestinian suicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians.*
5. *The Israelis are more responsible than the Palestinians are for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.*
6. *In general, Israeli leaders are sincere in their pursuit of peace with the Palestinians.*
7. *Zionism is a form of racism.*
8. *The Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own in Israel.*
9. *You support the Palestinian-led BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) movement.*
10. *The Canadian government should not impose sanctions on Israel.*

3.3 Attitudes toward Israel in the 2024 survey

To discover Canadians' sentiment toward Israel in the 2024 survey, I followed the same procedure that I described earlier with respect to attitudes toward Jews. I re-coded responses so low scores indicate positive sentiment and high scores negative sentiment, then created a 6-point scale summarizing the findings.⁵² Before turning to the scale of attitudes toward Israel, let us review the statement-by-statement results for the non-Jewish adult population as a whole. See Table 3.1.

Two features of Table 3.1 immediately stand out. First is the percentage of respondents who indicate DK/NR. This percentage ranges from 11 percent to 36 percent, with an average of 25 percent over the ten statements. Clearly, a substantial minority of Canadian adults lack crystallized attitudes toward Israel or are reluctant to state their opinions. The second striking feature of Table 3.1 is that Canadians' opinions about Israel are considerably more negative than are their opinions about Jews.

Table 3.1 “The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Israel. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of these statements,” non-Jewish Canadian adults, in percent

	1 Strongly disagree	2 Disagree	3 Slightly disagree	4 Slightly agree	5 Agree	6 Strongly agree	Don't know/ no response	Total
Positively worded questions								
1 Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East.	7	13	10	15	13	10	32	100
2 There is no justification for Palestinian suicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians.	2	3	6	7	22	48	11	100
3 In general, Israeli leaders are sincere in their pursuit of peace with the Palestinians	23	17	14	11	10	5	20	100
4 The Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own in Israel.	5	5	6	15	22	26	20	100
5 The Canadian government should not impose sanctions on Israel.	13	10	13	9	14	20	21	100
Negatively worded questions								
6 The war Israel is conducting in Gaza is an example of genocide.	19	11	7	18	14	17	14	100
7 Israel is an apartheid state.	15	11	7	11	11	12	32	100
8 The Israelis are more responsible than the Palestinians are for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza	16	12	9	11	9	12	31	100
9 Zionism is a form of racism	11	11	6	13	12	13	35	100
10 You support the Palestinian-led BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) movement.	24	14	6	8	5	8	36	100
Note: Shaded cells indicate positive attitudes towards Jews. Totals may not equal exactly 100 due to rounding.								

True, for five of the ten statements, the percentage of responses that reflect a positive attitude toward Israel significantly exceeds the percentage of responses that reflect a negative attitude.³³ Responses to these five statements include the following:

- “There is no justification for Palestinian suicide bombers targeting Israeli civilians” (77 percent agree, 11 percent disagree, 11 percent DK/NR).
- “The Jewish people are entitled to a state of their own in Israel” (63 percent agree, 16 percent disagree, 20 percent DK/NR).
- “You support the Palestinian-led BDS (boycott, divestment, and sanctions) movement” (21 percent agree, 44 percent disagree, 36 percent DK/NR).

- “Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East” (38 percent agree, 30 percent disagree, 32 percent DK/NR).
- “The Canadian government should not impose sanctions on Israel” (43 percent agree, 36 percent disagree, 21 percent DK/NR).

However, for two statements, the percentage difference between responses that reflect negative and positive attitudes toward Israel is too small to reach the standard minimum level of statistical significance:⁵⁴

- “Israel is an apartheid state” (34 percent agree, 33 percent disagree, 32 percent DK/NR).
- “The Israelis are more responsible than the Palestinians are for the past three years of violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (32 percent agree, 37 percent disagree, 31 percent DK/NR).

And for three statements, the percentage of responses that reflect a negative attitude toward Israel significantly exceed the percentage of responses that reflect a positive attitude.⁵⁵ These statements include the following:

- “The war Israel is conducting in Gaza is an example of genocide” (49 percent agree, 37 percent disagree, 14 percent DK/NR)
- “In general, Israeli leaders are sincere in their pursuit of peace with the Palestinians” (26 percent agree, 54 percent disagree, 20 percent DK/NR).
- “Zionism is a form of racism” (38 percent agree, 28 percent disagree, 35 percent DK/NR)


Overall, these results suggest that Israel may be losing the battle for Canadian public opinion. Comparatively few non-Jewish Canadians deny the need for a Jewish state, justify Palestinian suicide bombing, support the BDS movement, favour Canadian government sanctions against Israel, or reject the notion that Israel is the sole democracy in the Middle East (although some respondents may not have kept Israel’s occupied territories in mind when responding to the last statement). However, non-Jewish Canadians equivocate on whether Israel is an apartheid state and is disproportionately to blame for recent hostilities. And they are inclined to regard Israel’s war in Gaza as genocidal, Israel’s leaders as insincere in the pursuit of peace, and Zionism as a form of racism.

Glancing back at Figure 2.1, one is reminded that non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews are sharply skewed to the left side of the graph. This distribution indicates that Canadians have disproportionately positive attitudes toward Jews. In contrast, Figure 3.1 illustrates that the attitudes of non-Jewish Canadians toward Israel are approximately evenly distributed along the now-familiar 6-point scale. In fact,

the percentage of respondents scoring 1, 2, or 3 is almost exactly the same as the percentage scoring 4, 5, or 6 (49.8 percent versus 50.2 percent, respectively).

Another way of making this point is by noting that, for the non-Jewish Canadian population as a whole, the average score on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Israel is 3.1, significantly higher than the score of 2.3 on the scale of non-Jewish Canadians' attitudes toward Jews. There is a 99.9 percent likelihood that the difference between these two scores is not due to chance but reflects a difference in Canada's population.⁵⁶

Figure 3.1 Non-Jewish Canadians' attitudes toward Israel



3.4 The social distribution of attitudes toward Israel

3.4.1 Muslim/non-Muslim differences

Although it will not come as a surprise that Muslim Canadians are more negatively predisposed to Israel than are Canadians as a whole, especially given the intensity of the Israeli assault on Gaza during the period of this survey, the depth of their animosity is striking (Table 3.2). For instance, 30 percent of Muslim Canadians (42 percent of those who offer an opinion on the subject) believe that Palestinian suicide bombing of Israeli civilians is justified (43 percent disagree and 28 percent respond DK/NR). Thirty-seven percent (52 percent of those with an opinion) believe that the Jewish people are not entitled to a state of their own in Israel (34 percent hold the contrary opinion and 29 percent respond DK/NR). Fifty-four percent of Muslim adults in Canada regard Israel as an apartheid state (8 percent disagree and 38 percent reply DK/NR); 60 percent think that Zionism is a form of racism (8 percent disagree and 33 percent say DK/NR); and 81 percent regard the war that Israel is


3.4.2 Quebecois/non-Quebecois differences

The Quebecois/non-Quebecois difference on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Israel is smaller than the corresponding difference on the scale of attitudes toward Jews. In other words, Quebecois are more like the non-Jewish Canadian population as a whole in their attitudes toward Israel than in their attitudes toward Jews. Still, for Quebecois, the mean score on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Israel is 3.4, indicating that Quebecois are markedly less negative toward Israel than Muslim Canadians but significantly more negative than the Canadian population as a whole. The likelihood that these inter-group sample differences reflect the situation in the respective populations is greater than 95.0 percent.⁵⁸

3.4.3 The political spectrum

In Chapter 2 I found no association between political ideology and attitudes towards Jews. In contrast, a strong association exists between political ideology and attitudes toward Israel. The following was put to survey participants: “People sometimes place political opinions on a left-right spectrum. How would you characterize your political opinions on this spectrum? Please use a scale from 1 “extremely left” to 7 “extremely right”, with the mid-point 4 meaning “in the centre.” Figure 3.2 plots the mean score on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Israel by the self-identified political ideology of non-Jewish adults. The mean score for each ideological group on the scale appears above the curve. I inserted the percentage of non-Jewish adults in each ideological group below the curve.

Figure 3.2 Mean attitudes toward Israel by political ideology, non-Jewish adults




For non-Jews on the extreme left, the mean score on the scale of attitudes toward Israel is actually a shade higher than the mean score for Muslims (though not statistically significantly higher at conventional levels). The score drops with each succeeding move to the right, stabilizing just before reaching the extreme right. At 2.2 on the extreme right, the mean score on the scale of attitudes toward Israel is well below the score for the non-Jewish population as a whole (3.1). The chance that this sample difference is *not* present in the population is less than one in a thousand.⁵⁹

Dividing non-Jewish Canadians by the political party they would vote for “if an election were held tomorrow” and arraying their choices on a left-right party spectrum yields results consistent with those on self-identified political ideology. The mean score on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Israel is 2.3 for Conservative Party and People’s Party supporters (right), 3.6 for Liberal Party, Green Party, and Bloc Québécois, supporters (centre left), and 4.2 for supporters of the New Democratic Party (left).

3.4.4 The age gradient

A curve resembling that for political ideology, though not nearly as steep, reappears when plotting the mean score on the 6-point scale of attitudes toward Israel by age cohort. In Figure 3.3 the mean score for each age cohort appears above the curve and the percentage of non-Jewish adults in each age cohort below the curve. Younger age cohorts clearly have more negative attitudes toward Israel than older age cohorts do. This finding is in line with the results of a 5–6 November 2023 poll of 1,892 Canadian adults.⁶⁰

Figure 3.3 Mean attitudes toward Israel by age cohort, non-Jewish adults



Why the age gradient? Part of the explanation is that different Israels have shaped the attitudes of successive generations of people in the West to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Today's elderly people grew up knowing a courageous and resourceful Israel that managed to rise on the ashes of the Holocaust with the support of most of the world's countries. They reached adolescence, adulthood, or retirement age in a period when empathy toward Jews was at a maximum. Widespread recognition of the need for a sovereign Jewish state—in some cases combined with feeling a measure of responsibility if not guilt for the reluctance of Western countries to accept many Jewish refugees before and during World War II—grew out of this empathy.⁶¹

Today's middle-aged people remember the conciliatory Israel during the period 1993–2001, when the Oslo Accords gave the world hope that an end to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict was at hand. Their attitudes toward the Jewish State are undoubtedly influenced by that memory.

However, as Israel was transformed from a struggling and endangered mini-state into an economic and military regional powerhouse, it ceased to be perceived as an underdog by many younger Canadians. As perceptions changed, attitudes followed. Among younger Canadians, criticism of the Jewish state became more fashionable.

Members of today's younger generation have experienced nothing but the Netanyahu years. They have seen an increasingly right-wing government passing a law subordinating the rights of non-Jewish minorities and seeking to limit the authority of the Supreme Court, the country's main check on law-making. They have observed hastened construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and mounting Jewish settler violence there. And they have recognized the divide-and-conquer strategy that has the Palestinian Authority (PA) manage policing and social services in the West Bank and Qatar funding Hamas in Gaza. As Netanyahu told his party caucus in 2019, "Whoever opposes a Palestinian state must support delivery of funds to Gaza [from Qatar] because maintaining separation between the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza will prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state."⁶² From this point of view, the occupation of the West Bank and occasional military incursions in Gaza will suffice to maintain the status quo. Given this record, many liberal-minded and left-leaning youth see little to admire in the Israeli treatment of Palestinians and much to dislike.

In short, differential generational experience is surely part of the explanation for the age gradient.

3.5.5 University students

Another part of the explanation for the age gradient is that, in recent decades, many university students have been disproportionately exposed to, and influenced by, an oversimplified and one-sided interpretation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. We lack Canadian survey data examining this issue directly, but the results of a recent US survey likely resemble the situation in this country. It found that just 47 percent of university students who support the protesters' chant, "from the river to the sea," could name the river and the sea. The number of students supporting the chant fell from 85 percent to 27 percent when they were shown on a map that a Palestinian state stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea would leave no room for Israel; that recent surveys indicate most Israelis and Palestinians overwhelmingly reject a one-state solution to the conflict; and that replacing Israel with Palestine could require the subjugation, expulsion, or annihilation of seven million Israeli Jews.⁶³

Oblivious to, or dismissive of, the complexities of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, many Canadian university students have loudly proclaimed their anti-Israel sentiments. To cite an outstanding example, in a November 2023 referendum, 35 percent of eligible McGill students voted in favour of a controversial "Policy against Genocide in Palestine" that was opposed by the McGill administration and Jewish advocacy groups.⁶⁴

Thirty-five percent is without question a large minority. On the other hand, the results of the referendum suggest that nearly two-thirds of students who were eligible to vote opposed the policy, abstained, or did not care enough about it to register their opinion. Moreover, McGill is by no means representative of all Canadian universities.

To gain some perspective on this issue, it may be relevant to note that, shortly after the McGill referendum, a well-advertised pro-Palestine/anti-Israel demonstration at the University of Toronto's main downtown campus attracted no more than three hundred of its approximately sixty thousand registered students. An equally well advertised "walkout for Palestine" held on 29 January 2024 called on University of Toronto students to leave class at 2 p.m. to "protest the university's complicity in the ongoing genocide." At the main downtown campus, about one hundred students attended. At the university's Mississauga campus, where more than fifteen thousand students are registered, more than one-fifth of them Muslims, a few dozen students walked out.⁶⁵

Paradoxically, pervasive apathy concerning student governance contributes to the opinion of some observers that our institutions of higher education are anti-Israel hate factories. Consider the results of the 2024 student union election at the Scar-

borough campus of the University of Toronto, announced on 8 March 2024. Voter turnout was unusually strong: Whereas in the 2023 election 4 percent of eligible votes cast a ballot, 12 percent of the electorate did so in 2024. Two of the six seats were uncontested, so the sole candidates won by “acclamation” (a misnomer if there ever was one insofar as the victors won not due to acclaim for them but due to the ennui of their fellow students). Candidates who won the four contested seats crossed the finish line with an average of about 55 percent of the popular vote, so basically just over 6 percent of the student body decided the outcome. All six seats are now held by an organized anti-Israel slate.⁶⁶ As is the case in some other universities (and at the national level in the Canadian Federation of Students), lack of student interest allows a very small number of highly motivated individuals who share a monochromatic political outlook to become *the* voice of students.

Two Jewish Israeli professors working at US universities claim that campus anti-Israelism is less widespread and toxic than some ugly attention-grabbing incidents suggest.⁶⁷ Their observation applies equally to Canada’s universities. Among the various political party supporters, age cohorts, and other groups discussed in this chapter, non-Jewish university students are among those who have the most negative opinions about Israel (Figure 3.4 and Table 3.3). However, far from all students are of the same stripe, and many students are too busy studying, socializing with fellow students, holding down a part-time job, and taking care of family members to care much about student politics or politics in the Middle East.

Figure 3.4 Mean attitudes of thirteen non-Jewish Canadian groups toward Israel




Table 3.3 "The following statements reflect notions that some people have regarding Israel. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of these statements," non-Jewish Canadian university student, in percent

[illegible]

4

**How strongly are the two sets of
attitudes correlated?**

4.1 Is anti-Zionism antisemitism?

The greater the degree to which people are anti-Jewish, the more likely they are to be anti-Israel—and vice versa. We know this because researchers consistently find a low-moderate positive correlation between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes in national samples. This means that the two sets of attitudes are “related but not the same.”⁶⁸ Because they are not the same, I have sought to maintain a strict distinction between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel throughout this report. Because they are related, it is important to see how closely they are correlated in Canada. A strong positive correlation would add weight to the claim that anti-Zionism is antisemitism. The lack of a strong positive correlation would undermine that claim.

For the following discussion it may be helpful to remind the reader that the correlation coefficient (r) is a standard measure of association between two variables. It can vary between -1.0 and 1.0 . A value of 1.0 indicates a perfect positive correlation. In that case, an increase in one variable is associated with a proportionate increase in the other variable. A value of -1.0 indicates a perfect negative correlation. In this case, an increase in one variable is associated with a proportionate *decrease* in the other variable. A value of 0 indicates no correlation, in which case an increase or decrease in one variable is associated with no change in the other variable.

According to the most recent Anti-Defamation League survey as of this writing, the correlation between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes in the US was 0.380 in 2022.⁶⁹ Associations of similar direction and magnitude are found for nationally representative samples of adults in various European countries.⁷⁰ What about Canada?

The present survey found that, for the non-Jewish adult population of Canada, the correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel is 0.339 . The likelihood that negative attitudes toward Jews are accompanied by negative attitudes toward Israel and that positive attitudes toward Jews are accompanied by positive attitudes toward Israel is a little lower than in the US, but both countries are unexceptional in this regard. In Canada, the correlation is statistically significant at standard levels—there is less than one chance in a thousand that it is a fluke—but it is at the low end of moderate in strength.⁷¹

In December 2023 the US House of Representatives passed a resolution stating unequivocally that anti-Zionism is antisemitism. (The vote was 311 yea, 14 nay, with 92 Democratic members voting “present.”) The fact is, however, that the claim that anti-Zionism is antisemitism (and the implied corollary that pro-Zionism is philosemitism) would be supported only under two conditions. First, the correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel would have to be strong.

Second, because the claim is apparently stated as universally true—not as more valid for some groups, less valid for others—the correlation would have to be fairly invariant across various categories of the population.


Table 4.1 illustrates that the correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel actually varies widely across selected Canadian groups. The correlation is strong (0.500 or higher) for only four of the twelve groups of non-Jewish Canadians included in Table 4.1. It is moderate ($r = 0.300$ to 0.499) for three more groups, and weak to negligible (0.000 to 0.299) for five groups. These results suggest that, for most individuals and most groups, anti-Zionism is not antisemitism and pro-Zionism is not philosemitism.

Table 4.1 Correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel, non-Jewish Canadians, selected groups					
Strong to perfect $r = 0.500-1.000$		Moderate $r = 0.300-0.499$		Zero to weak $r = 0.000-0.299$	
Hard right	0.656**	Muslim	0.471**	Hard left	0.168**
Conservative	0.587**	All non-Jews	0.339**	University students	0.165**
65+ yr.-olds	0.584**	Liberal	0.328**	Quebecois	0.133
Green	0.531*			NDP, Bloc Québécois	0.121
				18-34 yr.-olds	0.109
Note: * $p < .01$; ** $p < 0.001$, two-tailed.					

The correlation is strongest for people who self-identify with the hard right (those who selected 6 and 7 on the 7-point political ideology scale), supporters of the Conservative and People’s Party, and those who are over the age of sixty-four. The correlation is at the high end of moderate for Muslims and supporters of the Green Party and at the low end of moderate for all non-Jews and Liberal Party supporters. It is weak to negligible for people who identify with the hard left (those who selected 1 and 2 on the political ideology scale), university students, Quebecois, 18–34-year-olds, and supporters of the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois.

Graphical representations of each correlation are another way of envisaging variation across groups in the association between attitudes toward Jews and toward Israel. I found four distinct patterns, portrayed in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 Scale of attitudes toward Jews by scale of attitudes toward Israel for selected non-Jewish groups



In the scatterplots, each triangle represents a respondent. The scatterplot labelled Pattern A is based on respondents who self-identify with the hard right. Supporters of the Conservative and People's Party have similar scatterplots, not shown here. Pattern A is a steep linear trend line. Hence the strong correlation. The clustering of respondents in the lower left quadrant means that most respondents in the scatterplot score low (that is, positively) on attitudes toward Jews and Israel. Hence the strong correlation.

Muslim respondents form Pattern B. Compared to Pattern A, the linear trend line is somewhat flatter, signifying a weaker correlation than in Pattern A. Significantly, the clustering of Muslim respondents in the upper right quadrant of the Pattern B scatterplot indicates that most respondents score relatively high (that is, negatively) on attitudes towards Jews and Israel. The scatterplot for Green Party supporters, not shown here, is a variant of Pattern B, with supporters clustering in the lower right quadrant, indicating highly negative attitudes toward Israel but less negative attitudes toward Jews than are found among Muslim respondents on average.

The respondents in the Pattern C scatterplot are non-Jews in Canada's general population. The scatterplot for respondents who support the Liberal Party, not shown here, looks much the same. Pattern C represents the Canadian norm. The linear trend line is flatter than that in Pattern B so the correlation is weaker.

Finally, respondents in the Pattern D scatterplot are from the non-Jewish university student sample. Scatterplots not shown here that resemble Pattern D include those for respondents who identify with the hard left, Quebecois, eighteen- to thirty-four-year-olds, and supporters of the New Democratic Party and the Bloc Québécois. For members of these groups, the linear trend line is practically flat, so the correlation between attitudes toward Jews and attitudes toward Israel is weak to negligible. As far the present survey can determine, most members of these left-leaning groups can and do distinguish their attitudes toward Jews from their attitudes toward Israel, a feature that is somewhat less evident for non-Jewish members of the general population and Liberal Party supporters, and much less evident for hard right respondents, supporters of right-leaning parties, elderly people, and Muslims.

Let us now examine Canadian Jews' sense of security, their perception of the extent and depth of antisemitism in the country, and how they think non-Jewish Canadians see them.

5

**How do Jews perceive the current
climate of opinion?**

5.1 Unsafe and victimized

Canadian Jews today tend to feel unsafe and victimized. The 414 Jewish respondents in the current survey were asked, “As a Jewish person in Canada, do you personally feel safer today than you did five years ago, less safe, or no difference from five years ago?” Sixty-three percent of the respondents (65 percent with an opinion on the matter) replied “less safe.” Sixty percent (62 percent with an opinion) said they feel less safe when the comparison was narrowed to “a few months ago.” Canadian Jews apparently feel safer than do American Jews: In a poll conducted in late October/early November 2023, 70 percent of American Jews said they felt less safe than they did a few months earlier.⁷²

The collective unease of the Jewish community is grounded in the sense that antisemitism is widespread and rising, with little hope for improvement in the future. The survey asked, “How much antisemitism do you think there is in Canada today?” Fifty-three percent of respondents (55 percent with an opinion) answered “a lot” and 37 percent (39 percent with an opinion) said “some.” Fully 82 percent (85 percent with an opinion) claimed that there is more antisemitism in Canada today compared to five years ago. Seventy-five percent (81 percent with an opinion) said that the level of antisemitism rose in their local community over the last few months, and 50 percent (62 percent with an opinion) expected that the level would rise in the future.

Concomitant with the opinion that antisemitism is widespread and growing is a radical change in perception about the level of discrimination experienced by members of the Jewish community. The 2018 *Survey of Jews in Canada* asked respondents: “For each of the following groups, please indicate whether you think they are often, sometimes, rarely, or never the subject of discrimination in Canadian society today.” The question was repeated in the 2024 survey that is the subject of this report. For the two surveys, Table 5.1 compares the percentage of individuals who said each of the six groups on the list “often” experiences discrimination. While Jews saw themselves as the group facing the fifth most discrimination in 2018, they see themselves as the group facing the most discrimination in 2024.

Table 5.1 “For each of the following groups, please indicate whether you think they are often, sometimes, rarely or never the subject of discrimination in Canadian society today,” percent saying “often”		
	2018	2024
Indigenous people	60	51
Muslim	51	39
Black people	49	43
Gay/lesbian people	38	33
Jews	34	54
South Asians	30	24
Note: Based on the calculation of sampling errors, there is a statistically significant difference at $p < 0.001$ between 2018 and 2024 for Muslims and Jews. For Indigenous people, the sample difference is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. For all other groups, sample differences are not significantly different ($p > 0.05$). Subtracting the percentages in each column from 100 yields the percent of respondents who responded “sometimes,” “rarely,” “never,” “don’t know,” and did not respond. Source for 2018: Robert Brym, Keith Neuman, and Rhonda Lenton, <i>2018 Survey of Jews in Canada</i> (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2018), SPSS dataset.		

The degree to which Canadian Jews feel they are unsafe is strongly associated with their emotional attachment to Israel. Just 20 percent of respondents who say they are “not very” or “not at all” attached to Israel feel less safe than they did a few months earlier. In contrast, among those who say they feel “somewhat attached” or “very attached” to Israel, 80 percent feel less safe.

Table 5.2 points to the centrality of Israel in shaping perceptions of anti-Jewish sentiment. It displays responses to the following question: “Different groups of Canadians may have different attitudes toward Jews. In general, how would you describe the attitude of members of each of the following groups toward Jewish people?” Responses range from “very negative” to “very positive.” According to Table 5.2, Canadian Jews believe that 79 percent of non-Jewish university students have somewhat negative or very negative attitudes toward Jews. Canadian Jews also believe that about 90 percent of Canadian Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians have somewhat negative or very negative attitudes toward Jews. These are precisely the groups that have been at the forefront of anti-Israel propaganda and action in Canada in recent months.

Table 5.2 “Different groups of Canadians may have different attitudes toward Jews. In general, how would you describe the attitude of members of each of the following groups toward Jewish people?” percent saying “somewhat negative” and “very negative”	
Group	Percent “somewhat negative” and “very negative”
Palestinian Canadians	91
Arab Canadians	91
Muslim Canadians	89
Non-Jewish university students	79
Quebecois	56
Black Canadians	45
All non-Jewish Canadians	42
Indigenous Canadians	34
Mainline Protestant Canadians	29
Catholic Canadians	20
Evangelical Protestant Canadians	17
Note: Subtracting the percentages from 100 yields the percent of respondents who responded “neither positive nor negative,” “somewhat positive,” “very positive,” “don’t know,” and did not respond.	

5.2 Experience of discrimination

Now consider Canadian Jewry’s actual experience of anti-Jewish discrimination (Table 5.3). The most common type of anti-Jewish discrimination does not occur on a direct interpersonal level: 56 percent of Canada’s Jews say they have seen anti-Jewish graffiti or vandalism in the past twelve months. This level of experience is not unexpected given that much anti-Jewish graffiti is scrawled on the walls of institutions that Jews frequent and that major acts of vandalism against Jewish institutions and businesses are typically reported in the mass media.

Direct interpersonal experience of discrimination ranges from hearing someone say that Jews care too much about money (experienced by 52 percent of Jewish respondents) to being harassed online (19 percent of Jewish respondents).

Finally, 7 percent of Jewish respondents report being physically threatened or attacked. Most of these experiences undoubtedly involve threats. Attacks such as the 8 November 2023 brawl at Concordia University between pro-Palestinian and Jewish students generally make the evening news.⁷³ Such reports are rare.

Table 5.3 “Please indicate whether each of the following things has happened to you in the past twelve months,” percent saying “yes, has happened”	
Incident	Percent “yes, has happened”
Seen anti-Jewish graffiti or vandalism in your local community?	56
Have heard someone say that Jews care too much about money?	52
Have heard someone say that the Holocaust did not happen or that its severity has been exaggerated?	49
Have heard someone say that Canadian Jews care more about Israel than about Canada?	35
Been made to feel unwelcome because you are Jewish or because of your Jewish background?	30
Been called offensive names because you are Jewish or because of your Jewish background?	20
Been harassed online because you are Jewish or because of your Jewish background?	19
Been physically threatened or attacked because you are Jewish or because of your Jewish background?	7
Note: Subtracting the percentages from 100 yields the percent of respondents who responded “no, has not happened,” “don’t know,” and did not respond.	

5.3 What do Jews consider antisemitic?

Canadian Jews believe that 42 percent of non-Jewish Canadians have “somewhat negative” or “very negative” attitudes toward Jews (Table 5.2). I interpret this as a higher level of perceived anti-Jewish sentiment than is evident from the analysis of non-Jewish Canadians’ attitudes toward Jews reported in chapter 2. Why does this gap between non-Jewish attitudes and Jewish perceptions exist?

To answer this question, I borrow from research conducted a few years ago in the UK and France in which Jewish survey participants were asked to review a list of statements and indicate which statements, if any, they regard as antisemitic.⁷⁴ Permitted responses included “Yes, definitely,” “Yes, probably,” “No, probably not,” “No, definitely not,” and “Don’t know”/No response. The responses, displayed in part in Table 5.4, provide insight into the question just raised. As Table 5.4 shows, the statements most often considered antisemitic involve Holocaust denial, with 83 to 91 percent of respondents considering such statements antisemitic. Next are slurs about Jews having a dangerous amount of power, with 80 to 82 percent of respondents considering them antisemitic. Finally, 64 to 69 percent of Canadian Jews regard extreme negative statements about the state of Israel—denying the need for a Jewish state, referring to Israel as an apartheid state, supporting the boycott of Israeli products, and asserting that Israel is committing genocide in its treatment of Palestinians—as antisemitic.

Table 5.4 “Would you consider people antisemitic if they say...,” percent saying “yes, probably” and “yes, definitely”	
Item	Percent
...the Holocaust is a myth or that it has been exaggerated?	91
Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes?	83
Jews have too much power in Canada’s politics?	82
Jews have too much power in Canada’s economy?	80
Jews have too much power in Canada’s media?	80
... there is no need for a separate Jewish state?	69
... Israel is “an apartheid state?”	66
... they support the boycott of Israeli goods/products?	65
... Israel is “committing genocide” in its treatment of Palestinians?	64
... things that are critical of certain Israeli policies?	26
Note: Subtracting the percentages in column 2 from 100 yields the percent of respondents who responded “no, probably not,” “no, definitely not,” “don’t now” and did not respond.	

A 2012 survey conducted in eight European countries found some corresponding percentages that were lower for Sweden, about the same for the UK, and higher for Belgium, Latvia, Hungary, Germany, and especially Italy and France.⁷⁵ I conclude that, although there is variation from one country to the next, there exists a widespread if not universal tendency for most Jews to regard extreme negative criticism of Israel as antisemitic. Many non-Jews, especially self-identified members of the left, may not regard extreme negative criticism of Israel as antisemitic, but most Jews do.

Much irony is embedded in the last set of findings. Anti-racist activists are eager to eliminate so-called microaggressions, that is, everyday slights directed against racial, ethnic, religious, and other minorities, even if the slights are unintentional. Yet they are unaware or do not care that their extreme negative statements about Israel—denying the need for a separate Jewish state (chanting “from the river to the sea”), claiming that Israel is and has been bent on genocide (when in fact the Palestinian population between the river and the sea grew from 1.3 million in 1947 to 6.7 million in 2022), and so on—cause most Jews to feel threatened, insulted, marginalized, and invalidated.⁷⁶ According to the 2024 survey, 70 percent of Canada’s Jews are “very” or “somewhat” emotionally attached to Israel. The 2018 *Survey of Jews in Canada* found that nearly 80 percent of Canada’s Jews have visited Israel at least once. Ten percent of Canada’s Jews were born in Israel or have lived there for at least six months.⁷⁷ It thus seems that, from the point of view of a large majority of Canadian Jews, many anti-racist activists commit not microaggressions but *macroaggressions* against Jews daily. As far as most Jews are concerned, the anti-Israel contempt that many people on the left repeatedly express is indistinguishable from antisemitism because it strikes near or at the heart of their Jewish identity and the existence of the Jewish people.⁷⁸

5.4 Emotional attachment to Israel

When I discovered that 70 percent of Jewish respondents in the 2024 survey said they are “very” or “somewhat” emotionally attached to Israel, I was surprised and concerned. Surprised because three previous surveys—one conducted in 2018, the others in February and September 2023, the last just a month before the outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war—placed the figure at an average of more than 77 percent.⁷⁹ Concerned because I thought this finding might mean that the sample of Jews on which this chapter is based underestimates Canadian Jews’ attachment to Israel due to sample bias. So I checked.

The *2018 Survey of Jews in Canada* found that Jews who do not identify as Jewish by religion are less emotionally attached to Israel than are individuals who identify as Jewish by religion. It also found that, although Judaism is not the primary basis of Jewish identification for many Canadian Jews, 95 percent of them identify their religion as Jewish. The corresponding figure in the 2024 survey is 91 percent. The difference between these two percentages is within sampling error, and therefore not statistically significant by conventional standards. This finding suggests that the 2024 sample is unbiased regarding Jewish religious identification—and therefore probably unbiased regarding strength of emotional attachment to Israel. The conclusion that the strength of many Canadian Jews’ attachment to Israel actually fell significantly after September 2023 and is not the result of sample bias is consistent with these results.⁸⁰

Data from the 2024 survey suggest why the emotional attachment to Israel of many Canadian Jews may have weakened recently. According to the survey, 28 percent of Canadian Jews with an opinion on the subject (26 percent of all Jewish respondents) find “Israel’s military response to the attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, ... excessive.” Moreover, the war may have led a certain number of Canadian Jews to feel less attached to Israel in light of the current Israeli government’s adamant and frequently repeated position regarding the Palestinians: The survey found that, contrary to the position of the current Israeli government, 55 percent of Canada’s Jews with an opinion on the matter (42 percent of all Canadian Jews) believe that “Israel and an independent Palestinian state [can] exist peacefully with each other,” while 51 percent with an opinion (38 percent of all Canadian Jews) believe that Israel does not have “the right to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank.”⁸¹

It is highly likely that the emotional attachment of many Canadian Jews to Israel has strengthened since 7 October 2023. Conflict between groups almost universally increases the solidarity of both groups.⁸² However, based on the foregoing analysis, it seems that more Canadian Jews have experienced a weakening rather than a strengthening of their emotional attachment to Israel. Whether their weakened

attachment will revert, persist, or weaken further once the Israel– Hamas war ends is impossible to say. Much apparently depends on the decisions and actions of the Israeli government regarding the Palestinian question.

6

Policy Implications

This survey's main takeaways are threefold. First, most non-Jewish Canadians do not have negative attitudes toward Jews. However, on average, some segments of the population—university students, Quebecois, and especially Muslims—have significantly more negative attitudes toward Jews than the societal norm. Second, negative attitudes toward Israel are more widespread than negative attitudes toward Jews among all segments of Canada's non-Jewish population. Third, the need for a Jewish state in Israel is a central value for most Canadian Jews, so when the existence of Israel is threatened verbally or physically, it is often perceived as a threat to the existence of the Jewish people and therefore as antisemitic. This seems to be the main reason why most Canadian Jews feel unsafe. These findings have important policy implications.

Consider first the Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) policies that have been adopted by universities, public bureaucracies, hospitals, and corporations. In practice, Jews have been largely excluded from the ambit of EDI policies because Jews are widely viewed as privileged and White. That is, Jews are presumed to have already been incorporated into the mainstream of these institutions, so EDI policies that attend to Jewish needs are supposedly unnecessary. Yet many Jews report hearing negative comments based exclusively on their religion or ethnicity. And when non-Jews are extremely critical of Israel, many Jews hear people denying them the right to exist as Jews. It is encouraging that 77 percent of non-Jewish Canadians, 71 percent of non-Jewish university students, and 67 percent of Muslim Canadians agree that Jews should be included in EDI policies. Now they must recognize that EDI policies designed to help overcome prejudice and discrimination can succeed only if they attend to what minority groups experience as prejudice and discrimination, and this is as true for Jews as it is for members of other minority groups.

Much public discourse concerning Jews and Israel is hostile and demonizing. It drives conflicting parties further apart rather than bringing them together in pursuit of solutions that have the potential to minimally satisfy the antagonists. Given that countless surveys have found that Palestinians and Israeli Jews have very little interest in living together in a single state, and that vanquishing one side or the other is unthinkable except to fanatics, both sides need to recognize the other's right to safety and sovereignty.

This idea might sound whimsical were it not for the fact that even today, in the midst of a horrific conflict, 42 percent of Canada's Jews (55 percent of those with an opinion on the matter) think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully, while 34 percent of Canada's Muslims (48 percent of those with an opinion) think that Jews are entitled to a state in Israel. These numbers show that the gap between the two communities is wide. However, past experience suggests that it is likely to narrow once current hostilities cease, particularly if an

enduring period of calm allows new Israeli and Palestinian leaders to resume talks and make tangible progress toward reconciliation. The number of DK/NRs for the survey questions mentioned in this paragraph (24 percent for the Jews, 29 percent for the Muslims) suggests that plenty of opportunity exists for equivocators to narrow the gap in Canada.

In the meantime, educators have a job to do to bring the two sides closer together. They need to teach non-Jewish students about the more than 3,000 years of continuous Jewish presence in Israel, the establishment of three Jewish states there in ancient times, the forced removal of most Jews from their land by the Babylonians and then the Romans, and the Jews' desperate need for a state of their own after the Holocaust and the forced exodus of 850,000 Jews from their North African and Middle Eastern homes in the 1950s and 1960s. Just as urgently, educators need to teach Jewish students about the Nakba, mounting Jewish settler violence in the West Bank, the indignity and despair caused by the Israeli occupation, now in its sixth decade, and the evolution of Palestinian nationalism since the late nineteenth century. The point of such instruction should be not to brand one side or the other as terrorists or genocidal settler colonialists but to demonstrate that both peoples need a homeland and can divide the territory from the river to the sea in a way that is beneficial to them both.⁸³

A final policy implication of this survey concerns the fact that Canada's Jewish community is itself riven. More than a few Canadian Jews find reason to be critical of the Israeli government for the manner in which it has dealt with the Palestinian question. This category of Canadian Jewry certainly includes the 51 percent of those with an opinion on the matter who think that Israel does not have the right to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Most Jewish community leaders (who are unelected) and their spokespersons evidently do not share such opinions. They have claimed that Jewish critics of Israeli government policy are an insignificant and marginal minority.⁸⁴ The findings of this study challenge the leadership's claim. Perhaps the findings will also help to convince them that entertaining greater diversity of opinion on issues of cardinal importance to all community members would help heal rifts within the community and build stronger bridges to non-Jewish ethnic and religious groups, especially members of the Muslim community.

1

"The Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] ... looks forward to fulfill the promise of Allah no matter how long it takes because the Prophet of Allah ... says: 'The Last Hour would not come until the Muslims fight against the Jews and the Muslims would kill them....' Hamas, 'Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,' Muhammad Maqdsi, trans. *Journal of Palestine Studies* (22, 4: 1993 [1988]), 124, <https://tinyurl.com/2vnnch59>. The 2017 revision of the charter tempers its language. The reasons for the revision are open to interpretation. My view is that it represents a public relations play more than a change of heart.

2

Amaney A. Jamal and Michael Robbins, "What Palestinians really think of Hamas," *Foreign Affairs*, 25 October 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/2p8w38uy>; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Public opinion poll no. 87," 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/2n7rn3ac>.

3

Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, "Israel foreign policy index 2023," 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/453wzpsb>.

4

Arab World for Research and Development, 2023, "Wartime poll: Results of an opinion poll among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," <https://tinyurl.com/ykfrkc2e>. A poll conducted a month later found that 72 percent of Palestinians in the occupied territories believed that the decision of Hamas to launch its offensive against Israel was correct, while support for Haniyeh in a presidential contest against Barghouti stood at 49 percent. Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, "Public opinion poll no. 90," 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/43r8rfsf>.

5

International MA Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation, "Findings: The Peace Index, November 2023" (Tel Aviv: Gershon H. Gordon Faculty of Social Sciences, Tel Aviv University, 2023), <https://tinyurl.com/56sptm3>.

6

See also Angus Reid Institute, "Israel-Gaza: Canadians share sympathies with both sides in warzone, two-thirds call for ceasefire," 2023, <http://tinyurl.com/3fs43ay9>; Mainstreet Research, "Mainstreet Survey Research—Can-

ada," 2023, <http://tinyurl.com/3sza8krk>. The UJA Federation of Greater Toronto has also conducted a relevant survey but my request to see their data went unanswered.

7

"Broadly representative and independent" means that the sample of 1,121 non-Jewish adults includes some students and Muslims because they are part of the non-Jewish adult population, while the sample of 1,010 non-Jewish university students includes some Muslims because they are part of the student body. However, the Muslims and students in these two samples do not re-appear in the samples of 312 Muslims or the sample of 1,010 non-Jewish university students. Note also the samples are not probability samples. The statistical purist will claim that tests of statistical significance should therefore not be performed on the data. However, in addition to weighting the data using population characteristics known from the 2021 census, I compared key variables with 2021 census results and the results of other surveys (see, for example, footnote 80). These procedures increased my confidence that the samples in this survey are approximately representative. Needing a standard that would allow me to distinguish meaningful from non-meaningful results, I therefore felt justified in bending the purist's rule.

8

Charles Shahrar, 2021: *The Jewish Population of Canada* (Toronto: Jewish Federations of Canada, 2023), 107.

9

The 30,000 figure is from the Hamas Ministry of Health. On 19 February 2024 the Israeli government estimated that the IDF had killed 12,000 Hamas fighters. Statistician Abraham Wyner estimates that the ratio of noncombatant to combatant Palestinian deaths is between 1:1 and 1.4:1. The IDF/Wyner estimates imply that on 19 February 2023 Palestinian deaths totaled between 24,000 and 28,800. Emanuel Fabian, "IDF says 12,000 Hamas fighters killed in Gaza war, double the terror group's claim," *Times of Israel*, 20 February 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/bdfs4vv5>; Abraham Wyner, "How the Gaza Ministry of Health fakes casualty numbers," *Tablet*, 6 March 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/2zum3eb>.

10

Robert Brym and Robert Andersen, "Rational choice and the political bases of changing Israeli counterinsurgency strategy," *British Journal of Sociology* (62, 3: 2011), 482-503.

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Arthur Hertzberg, ed., *The Zionist Idea* (New York: Atheneum, 1976 [1959]); Milton Viorst, *Zionism: The Birth and Transformation of an Ideal* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2016).

12

Neve Gordon, "The 'new anti-Semitism,'" *London Review of Books* (40, 1: 2018), <https://tinyurl.com/y8wsgamc>; Robert S. Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession: Anti-semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad* (New York: Random House, 2010).

13

David Engel, "Away from a definition of antisemitism: An essay in the semantics of historical description," in *Rethinking European Jewish History*, Jeremy Cohen and Moshe Rosman, eds. (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2009), 30-53; Ezra Mendelsohn, "Interwar Poland: Good for the Jews or bad for the Jews?" in *The Jews in Poland*, Chimen Abramsky, Maciej Jachimczyk, and Antony Polonsky, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 130-9; Scott Ury and Guy Miron, eds., *Antisemitism and the Politics of History* (Waltham MA: Brandeis University Press, 2024 [2020]). In contrast, sociologists tend to agree that intention is of little relevance in this matter. The consequences of statements, actions, and policies are what count. This is the core idea behind the sociological concept of institutional, systemic or structural racism and critical race theory. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, *On Intersectionality: Essential Writings* (New York: New Press, 2019).

14

Compare Sergio DellaPergola, "Jewish perceptions of antisemitism in the European Union, 2018: A new structural look," *Analysis of Current Trends in Antisemitism* (41, 1: 2020), 1-86, <https://tinyurl.com/3ebxtf3>; Sergio DellaPergola, "How best to define antisemitism: A structural approach," *Antisemitism Studies* (8, 1: 2024), 4-42.

15

CP24, "2,000 parents sign letter expressing concerns of 'escalating incidents of antisemitism' at Toronto schools," 22 November 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/32ysjc5v>.

16

Anti-Defamation League, 2019, "2019 survey update," <https://tinyurl.com/4w6p5cux>. The other countries in the survey include Argentina, Brazil, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Hungary, South Africa, Austria, Belgium, the UK, Denmark, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Quebecois are characterized by a higher level of antisemitism than are Canadians living outside Quebec. Thus, a recent poll (using a different measure of antisemitism than the ADL survey) shows that just 5 percent of Canadians outside Quebec can be classified as antisemitic. This finding implies that Canada outside Quebec might rank with or below Sweden in the ADL survey. Reginald Bibby, "Jews and the Christian Goliath," in *The Ever-Dying People? Canada's Jews in Comparative Perspective*, Robert Brym and Randal F. Schnoor, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2023), 179-94.

17

Angus Reid Institute, "Canada across the religious spectrum: A portrait of the nation's inter-faith perspectives during Holy Week," 18 April 2022, <https://tinyurl.com/bdh958ec>.

18

For the 2019 data, see Anti-Defamation League, "2019 survey," and Bibby, "Jews and the Christian Goliath." For the 1984 data, see Robert Brym and Rhonda Lenton, "The distribution of antisemitism in Canada in 1984," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* (16, 4: 1991), 411-18, <https://tinyurl.com/mpn5ydrw>. US data follow the same trend from 1964 to 2016. See Jeffrey E. Cohen, "From antisemitism to philosemitism? Trends in American attitudes toward Jews from 1964 to 2016," *Religions* (9, 4: 2018), 2-21, <https://tinyurl.com/z9kck77h>.

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Ayelet Kuper, "Reflections on addressing antisemitism in a Canadian faculty of medicine," *Canadian Medical Education Journal* (14, 2: 2023), <https://tinyurl.com/y4pvhf4z>.

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Quoted in Bell and Semple, "Investigation: The antisemitism that Oct. 7 unleashed in Canada," Global News, 20 February 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/368w66z3>.

21

Robert Brym, "Antisemitic and anti-Israel actions and attitudes in Canada and internationally: A research agenda," *Patterns of Prejudice* (53, 4: 2019), 407-20. However, an April-May 2023 survey of 3,035 Ontarians, including

oversamples of 228 Jews (by religion), 235 Muslims, 242 Blacks, and 290 East Asians, found no statistically significant difference between Jews and non-Jews in the frequency with which they reported experiencing hate over the preceding three years. Mosaic Institute, *Understanding Hate in Ontario* (Toronto: 2023), <http://tinyurl.com/mwjrfadv>.

22

Cf. Günther Jikeli, "Explaining the discrepancy of antisemitic acts and attitudes in 21st century France," *Contemporary Jewry* (37, 2: 2017), 257-73.

23

Vibeke Moe, "How people explain antisemitism: Interpretation of survey answers," in *The Shifting Boundaries of Prejudice: Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Contemporary Norway*, Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds. (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 2020), 274-96, <https://tinyurl.com/2hubkzxf>; Daniel Hickey et al., "Auditing Elon Musk's impact on hate speech and bots," paper presented at the International Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Conference on Web and Social Media (Washington DC, 2023), <https://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.04129.pdf>.

24

Brym, "Antisemitic and anti-Israel." According to Mark Mendelson, lead homicide detective with the Toronto police for fourteen years (and a Jew), the number of antisemitic incidents is also likely inflated because Jews are more likely to report hate crimes than are other groups, especially Asian Canadians. He might have added that undocumented immigrants may be a target of hatred yet decline to report it for fear of deportation. Avi Feingold, Ilana Zackon, and David Sklar, "Are Jews really the most-targeted group for hate crimes—or do we just call the cops more?" 31 March 2022, in *Bonjour Chai*, produced by Michael Fraiman, podcast, 1:20:16, <https://tinyurl.com/yc4v57rm>. Note too that about three-quarters of antisemitic incidents recorded by B'nai Brith Canada now occur online. However, unlike the ADL, B'nai Brith Canada counts each social media post as an incident, with retweets counted as separate incidents. In 2020, this procedure led B'nai Brith Canada to implausibly report 29 percent more antisemitic incidents in Canada than the ADL reported for the US, where the population is nine times larger, and the Jewish population fifteen times larger. See Anti-Defamation

League, 2021, "The state of antisemitism in America 2020," <https://tinyurl.com/372r6k3z>; B'nai Brith Canada, 2021, "Audit of antisemitic incidents 2020," <https://tinyurl.com/3ans9aun>.

25

Moe, "How people explain," 274-96.

26

Ayal K. Feinberg, "Homeland violence and diaspora insecurity: An analysis of Israel and American Jewry," *Politics and Religion* (13, 1: 2019), 1-27. See also Lee Jussim et al., "Anti-Zionism, antisemitism, and the polarization pendulum." Network Contagion Research Institute, 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/munzdsbr>.

27

B'nai Brith Canada, 2023, "Audit of antisemitic incidents 2022," <https://tinyurl.com/3r3yjdkr>.

28

Yagil Levy, "The Israeli army has dropped the restraint in Gaza, and the data shows [sic] unprecedented killing," *Haaretz*, 9 December 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/ym48dj8c>.

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Bell and Semple, "Investigation," Ania Bessonov, "Reported hate crimes in several Canadian cities higher amid Israel-Hamas war, police say," CBC News, 3 November 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/9d92y3sn>; Sam Margolis, "Vancouver police explain the statistics behind the surge in reported antisemitic incidents during the final months of 2023," *Canadian Jewish News*, 17 January 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/ym5cecur>; Toronto Police Service, "News Conference, 11 January 2024," YouTube, <http://tinyurl.com/yzd2cskt>.

30

Throughout, I calculate percentages of respondents "with an opinion" by excluding DK/NR responses from the denominator.

31

I first reverse-coded positive statements so more negative attitudes received higher scores and less negative attitudes received lower scores. I then calculated Cronbach's alpha to test whether the eight items form a reliable scale. The result ($\alpha = 0.877$) increases confidence in the scale's reliability. Finally, I calculated the mean for each respondent on all eight items, divided the means into six equal ranges, and determined how many respondents are in each range.

32

For a more sober analysis, see Avi Feingold and Phoebe Maltz Bovy, "Is life really miserable for Jews—or does the media just make it seem that way?" 9 March 2024, in *Bonjour Chai*, produced by Zachary Kauffman, podcast, 51:12, <https://tinyurl.com/5z3y3wzy>.

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Eitan Hersch and Laura Royden, "Antisemitic attitudes across the ideological spectrum," *Political Research Quarterly* (76: 2, 2023), 697-711; Jeffrey E. Cohen, "American Muslim attitudes toward Jews," *Religions* (13, 5: 2022), <https://tinyurl.com/4t9xy3vy>.

34

Daniel Staetsky, "The left, the right, Christians, Muslims, and detractors of Israel," *Contemporary Jewry* (40: 2020), 259-92.

35

Jeffrey E. Cohen, "Left, right, and antisemitism in European public opinion," *Politics and Religion* (12, 2: 2018b), 341-71, <https://tinyurl.com/bdz3jp2z>; Werner Bergmann, "How do Jews and Muslims in Norway perceive each other?" in *The Shifting Boundaries of Prejudice: Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Contemporary Norway*, Christhard Hoffmann and Vibeke Moe, eds. (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 2020), 221; Günther Jikeli, "Antisemitic attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A survey review," ISGAP Occasional Paper Series, 1, Charles Asher Small, ed., 2015, <http://tinyurl.com/yfcwefey>. An earlier survey of ten Western European countries found similar results for the effects of age and self-identification as Muslim. See Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small, "Anti-Israel sentiment predicts anti-Semitism in Europe," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (50, 4: 2006), 548-61.

36

Bibby, "Jews and the Christian Goliath," 186; Morton Weinfeld, "Antisemitism in Canada," in *The Ever-Dying People?*, 39-55.

37

A two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means test yields $t = 19.55$ ($p < 0.001$).

38

Wilhelm Kempf, "Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel: Methodology and results of the ASCI survey," *Conflict & Communication Online* (14, 1: 2015), <http://tinyurl.com/yc36v2xu>.

39

Jewish economic success is largely the result of relatively high educational and occupational

attainment as reflected in the high proportion of Jewish lawyers, physicians, dentists, computer programmers, software engineers, information systems analysts, university professors, senior financial managers, and the like. See Feng Hou and Robert Brym, "Are the Chinese Canada's new Jews?" in *The Ever-Dying People?*, 195-213.

40

Adbolmohammad Kazemipur, "Religion in the Canadian ethnic landscape: The Muslim factor," in *Immigration, Racial and Ethnic Studies in 150 Years of Canada: Retrospects and Prospects*, Shibao Guo and Llyod Wong, eds. (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2018), 161-280; Adbolmohammad Kazemipur, "Islamophobia in Canada between populism and political correctness," in *Racism, Islamophobia, Antisemitism and the Future of Canadian Society*, Robert Brym, ed. (Oakville ON: Rock's Mills Press, 2020), 7-27; Adbolmohammad Kazemipur, "From the Jewish Question to the Muslim Question," in *The Ever-Dying People?*, 165-78; Naomi Lightman, "Immigrant and non-immigrant income," in *The Ever-Dying People?*, 100-13.

41

Statistics Canada, "Religion by gender and age: Canada, provinces and territories," 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/2vyc5mc7>.

42

Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, "Introduction: Being young and Muslim in neoliberal times," in *Being Young and Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North*, Asef Bayat and Linda Herrera, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3-24; Hannes Weber, "Age structure and political violence: A re-assessment of the 'youth bulge' hypothesis," *International Interactions* (45, 1: 2019), 80-112.

43

A two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means test yields $t = 6.78$ ($p < 0.001$).

44

The correlation (r) is -0.067 , $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed).

45

Statistics Canada, "Participation rate in education, population aged 18 to 34, by age group and type of institution attended," 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/3xjns8rj>.

46

Howard Gerson and Harold Waller, "Opinion: Campus hate factories are a threat to liberal democracy," *National Post*, 29 November

2023, <https://tinyurl.com/4mr5kr7>; Henry Srebrnik, "Some Canadian universities have become hotbeds of antisemitism," *Columbus Jewish News*, 17 November 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/4zp6pm6j>. See also Ayelet Kuper, "Reflections" and Jonathan Rothman, "Jewish students at Canadian universities say there's a new level of worry on campus," *Canadian Jewish News*, 18 October 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/3axsfzt2>;

47

Two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means tests yield $t = 10.30$, $p < 0.001$ for the student/general population comparison; $t = 0.98$, $p > 0.05$ for the student/Quebecois comparison, and $t = 12.23$, $p < 0.001$ for the student/Muslim comparison.

48

For a critique of the common view, see Tony Huiquan Zhang and Robert Brym, "Tolerance of homosexuality in 88 countries: Education, political freedom and liberalism," *Sociological Forum* 34(2), 501-21.

49

Neil Orlowsky, Danielle Legerman, and Karen Cheung, *Canadian Universities Antisemitism Report 2024* (Toronto: The Abraham Global Peace Initiative, 2024), <http://tinyurl.com/3ynym8jn>.

50

A two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means test yields $t = 3.33$, $p < 0.001$.

51

Sergio DellaPergola, "Jewish demography and identity in nine countries," in *The Ever-Dying People?*, 249-66.

52

I calculated Cronbach's alpha to test whether the ten items form a reliable scale. The result ($\alpha = 0.946$) is highly encouraging in this regard.

53

Based on a calculation of sampling errors, $p < 0.001$ for the first four of these statements and $p < 0.05$ (barely) for the last one.

54

Based on a calculation of sampling errors, $p > 0.05$.

55

Based on a calculation of sampling errors, $p < 0.001$ for the first three of these statements and $p < 0.05$ (barely) for the last one.

56

A two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means test yields $t = 17.15$, $p < 0.001$.

57

A two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means test yields $t = 19.15$, $p < .001$.

58

A two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means test yields $t = 1.85$, $p < .05$.

59

A two-sample one-tailed difference-of-means test yields $t = 4.181$, $p < .001$.

60

Mainstreet Research, 19.

61

Irving M. Abella and Harold Troper, *None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2023 [1982]).

62

Quoted in Aluf Benn, "Israel's self-destruction: Netanyahu, the Palestinians, and the price of neglect," *Foreign Affairs*, 7 February 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/52kd3s64>. At a 16 December 2023 press conference, Netanyahu expressed pride in preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state and putting the brakes on the Oslo peace process. Jeremy Sharon and *Times of Israel* staff, "Pointing to Hamas's 'little state,' Netanyahu touts his role blocking 2-state solution," *Times of Israel*, 17 December 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/mf6wj33f>.

63

Ron E. Hassner, "From which river to which sea?" *Wall Street Journal*, 5 December 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/32xvm2uv>. Support might have fallen still further if the questionnaire had mentioned the following: (1) In 1937, the Palestinians rejected and the Zionists accepted in principle a British partition plan that would have created a Jewish state, a larger Palestinian state associated with Trans-Jordan, and joint control of a corridor between Jerusalem and Jaffa. (2) In 1947, the Palestinians rejected and the Zionists accepted United Nations Resolution 181, which, if implemented, would have created a Jewish state considerably smaller than the pre-1967 State of Israel, a Palestinian state, and international control of Jerusalem. (3) In 2001, the Palestinians rejected and the Zionists accepted the so-called Taba proposal, which assigned Gaza and 97 percent of the West Bank to sovereign

Palestine, allocated to Palestine compensatory Israeli land and a "safe passage corridor" linking the West Bank and Gaza, and designated part of East Jerusalem as Palestine's capital. (4) Following the creation of the State of Israel, most of the 850,000 Jews in the Muslim-majority countries of the Middle East and North Africa were compelled to migrate to Israel after facing discrimination, dispossession, and violence. See "Peel Commission Full Report (1937)—English," The Israeli-Palestinian conflict: An interactive database, 1937, <http://tinyurl.com/3hbvyz93>, esp. 422 for the proposed international boundaries; "United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181," Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, 1947, <http://tinyurl.com/3rwvp5fv>, especially "Part II: Boundaries"; "Taba negotiations: The Moratinos non-paper," MidEast Web, 2002, <https://tinyurl.com/yepsccce>; Martin Gilbert, *In Ishmael's House: A History of Jews in Muslim Lands* (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 208-81.

64

Jesse Feith, "McGill students vote in favour of pro-Palestinian policy," *Montreal Gazette*, 20 November 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/2p8y9z53>.

65

Figures for the number of demonstrators are based on reports from faculty members who observed the event on the Mississauga campus and Maeve Ellis and Selia Sanchez, "U of T students organize walkout, town hall in solidarity with Palestine," *The Varsity*, 5 February 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/mvmv8mtw>. The quotation is from Toronto Students for Palestine, "UOFT TRI-CAMPUS WALKOUT FOR PALESTINE," Instagram, 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/mfwd76jf>. The proportion of Muslims at the Mississauga campus is my estimate, based on 2021 census findings that (1) 17 percent of Mississauga's population is Muslim and (2) the median age of the Muslim population in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area is comparatively young. Statistics Canada, "Census Profile, 2021 Census of Population. Profile table," 2023, <http://tinyurl.com/4xzzwrcr>; Statistics Canada, "Religion by gender and age."

66

James Bullanoff, "Hunain Sindhu elected SCSU president with voter turnout of approximately 12 percent," *The Varsity*, 8 March 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/ymsd78aj>.

67

Shachar Pinsker and Arie M. Dubnov, "Toxicity doesn't rule the Hamas-Israel debate on US college campuses," *Haaretz*, 26 November 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/4bt4r7fs>. On US universities, see Ipsos, "Jewish on campus poll: Antisemitism at colleges and universities," 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/3cckt67x>; Eitan Hersh, "U.S. college students and the war in Israel: Jewish engagement and social tension on campus," *Jim Joseph Foundation*, 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/4xzc29ab>; Robert A. Pape, *Understanding Campus Fears After October 7 and How to Reduce Them* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2024), <https://tinyurl.com/2pu-tyr69>; Graham Wright et al., *In the Shadow of War: Hotspots of Antisemitism on US College Campuses* (Waltham MA: Maurice and Marilyn Cohen Center for Modern Jewish Studies, Brandeis University: 2023), <https://tinyurl.com/49nk7mmj>.

68

Staetsky, "The left," 264.

69

Anti-Defamation League, "Antisemitic attitudes in America: Topline findings," 2023, <http://tinyurl.com/2v28ne87>. For adults between the ages of 18 and 30, the comparable value of r was 0.280 ("weak"), while for adults over the age of 30 the value of r was 0.430 ("moderate"). The overlap between anti-Jewish and anti-Israel attitudes is substantially less for younger people in the US because, as noted earlier, they tend to be more anti-Israel and less anti-Jewish than are older Americans.

70

Kaplan and Small, "Anti-Israel sentiment." See also Steven K. Baum and Masato Nakazawa, "Anti-Semitism versus anti-Israeli sentiment," *Journal of Religion and Society* (9: 2007), 1-8, <https://tinyurl.com/2kryk9pb>; Peter Beattie, "Anti-Semitism and opposition to Israeli government policies: the roles of prejudice and information," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (40, 15: 2017), 2749-67; Florette Cohen et al., "Modern anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli attitudes," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (97, 2: 2009), 290-306; Florette Cohen et al., "The modern anti-Semitism Israel model: An empirical relationship between anti-Semitism and opposition to Israel," *Conflict & Communication Online* (10, 1: 2011), <https://tinyurl.com/3knr2w56>.

71

$p < 0.001$ (two-tailed). I adopt the widely cited nomenclature and cut-offs for correlations in the behavioural sciences suggested by Jacob Cohen, *Statistical Power for the Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1988).

72

Jewish Federations of North America, 2023 Israel Hamas Sentiment Survey, 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/4hce8mj3>

73

Joe Lofaro, "1 arrested, 3 injured in violent clashes between Concordia students over Israel-Hamas war," CTV News Montreal, 8 November 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/5n6n9jjm>.

74

Daniel Staetsky, "Is criticism of Israel antisemitic? What do British and French Jews think about the link between antisemitism and anti-Israel attitudes among non-Jews?" in *Unity and Diversity in Contemporary Antisemitism: The Bristol-Sheffield Hallam Colloquium on Contemporary Antisemitism*, Jonathan G. Campbell and Lesley D. Klaff, eds. (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2019), 40-64. See also Julian Hargeaves and Daniel Staetsky, "Antisemitism and Islamophobia: measuring everyday sensitivity in the UK," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (43, 12: 2020), 2176-98.

75

Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi, *Different Antisemitisms: Perceptions and Experiences of Antisemitism among Jews in Sweden and across Europe* (London UK: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2017), 20, <http://tinyurl.com/yckfhvvy>.

76

Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish population, 2022," *American Jewish Yearbook 2022*, Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin, eds. (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2023), 325; Jewish Virtual Library, "Jewish & Non-Jewish Population of Israel/Palestine (1517 - Present)," 2024, <http://tinyurl.com/4e5sjxnh>.

77

Brym, Neuman, and Lenton, 2018 Survey, 58.

78

I cannot resist recounting an incident that took place in my Introductory Sociology class at the University of Toronto in 2021. I happened to use the word "Jew" in a lecture. After class a non-Jewish student informed me that uttering this word is a microaggression against Jews.

She said I should have used "Jewish person" because referring to someone as a Jew is necessarily offensive. I asserted that by defining "Jew" as necessarily offensive, she was denying me my very identity, which is precisely the opposite of what anti-racist activists seek to achieve. She dropped the course as an act of protest over my insensitivity.

79

Brym, Neuman, and Lenton, 2018 Survey, 57; Robert Brym, "Most Canadian Jews oppose policies favoured by the new Israeli government," *Association of Canadian Jewish Studies Bulletin* (37, 1: 2023), 14, <http://tinyurl.com/mw82df4m>; Robert Brym, "Canada's Jewish population, 2023: Focus on minorities and attitudes toward Israel's new government," *American Jewish Year Book 2023*, vol. 123, Arnold Dashefsky and Ira M. Sheskin, eds. (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2024).

80

I also examined the effect of *religiosity* on emotional attachment to Israel in the 2018 and 2024 surveys. Fifteen percent of the 2018 respondents who answered a question on how often they attend religious services replied "at least once a week." The corresponding percentage in the 2024 surveys was 7 percent. Based on the calculation of sampling errors, a statistically significant difference exists between the two sample years ($p < 0.001$); respondents in the 2024 sample are less religious than those in the 2018 sample. That difference could account wholly or partly for the fact that emotional attachment to Israel is significantly lower in 2024 than in 2018. However, probing further, I found that the correlation between religious identification and emotional attachment to Israel is 0.245, while the correlation between religious identification and emotional attachment to Israel, controlling for religiosity, is 0.236. The fact that the control barely changes the correlation suggests that the correlation between religious identification and emotional attachment to Israel is not spurious. This result is consistent with the conclusion that the strength of many Canadian Jews' attachment to Israel actually fell significantly after September 2023 and is not the result of sample bias.

81

A tiny minority of 4 percent of Jewish respondents even replied "no" when asked, "Do you believe Israel has the right to exist as a Jewish state?"

82

Robert Brym and Bader Araj, "Palestinian suicide bombing revisited: A critique of the outbidding thesis," *Political Science Quarterly* (123, 3: 2008) 485-500.

83

"Settler colonialism" is one term in the vocabulary of the so-called woke community that does not trouble me. Many countries—perhaps most of them—are based on settler colonialism. I would certainly include Canada, the US, the UK, Russia, and China on the list. The questions first raised in the early 1990s are (1) how can the truth of settler colonialism be recognized and (2) how can reconciliation be effected between the colonists and the colonized? Unless for the sake of consistency anti-racist activists wish to advocate that all six million living post-1750 settlers vacate Toronto to make room for the Wendat, the Anishinaabeg, the Haudenosaunee, the Métis, and the Mississaugas of the Credit First Nation or face deportation or worse, they need a better plan for the Jews in Israel.

84

Andrew Cohen, "The unspeakable silence of the Canadian Jewish establishment," *Globe and Mail*, 17 March 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/ymf7jjja>.

Appendix

Table A1 Weighted sample characteristics, selected variables, in percent				
General non-Jewish adult population		Muslim adults	Jewish adults	University students
Gender				
Female	51	51	50	56
Male	48	49	50	42
Other	<1	0	<1	2
No response	1	0	0	<1
Total	100	100	100	100
Age				
18-34	26	38	23	88
35-44	17	23	15	9
45-54	16	18	14	3
55-64	17	12	16	1
65+	24	9	33	<1
No response	1	0	0	<1
Total	100	100	100	100
Province/Territory				
BC	14	7	10	12
AL	11	11	4	11
SK	3	1	<1	3
MN	4	1	3	4
ON	38	53	52	43
QC	23	23	21	21
NB	2	1	<1	2
NS	3	<1	1	4
PI	1	<1	<1	<1
NL	1	<1	<1	1
YK, NU	<1	0	0	0
No response	<1	2	9	0
Total	100	100	100	100
Educational attainment*				
High school	39	11	11	
College	33	22	20	
University	28	67	69	
Total	100	100	100	

Table A1 continued				
General non-Jewish adult population		Muslim adults	Jewish adults	University students
<i>Ethnicity**</i>				
Indigenous	3.8	0.3	0.4	1.5
British Isles	18.1	0.6	5.8	7.8
French Canadian	12.1	1.5	1.3	9.3
Eastern European	4.6	0.6	12.0	2.9
Other European	11.0	3.0	5.2	9.2
Canadian	43.7	10.1	29.1	32.5
Jewish	0.2	0	41.3	0.4
Arab	0.5	29.0	0.8	4.2
Caribbean, Black African	2.0	9.2	1.0	7.0
Latin American	0.7	0.3	0.3	1.8
Other Asian	2.2	42.9	0.8	21.6
Other	0.6	1.5	1.9	0.1
DK/NR	0.6	1.2	0.3	1.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total responses	1,809	338	756	1,374
<i>Years of study in university</i>				
1-4 yrs.				85
5+ yrs.				15
No response				<1
Total				100
<i>General area of study</i>				
Soc. sciences, human-ities				25
Business				22
Law				6
Education				6
STEM fields				24
Health, medicine				15
Other				2
No response				<1
Total				100
*High school=high school diploma or less. College=registered apprenticeship, trades certificate or diploma, college, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma. University=bachelor's degree or postgraduate degree.				
**Respondents could choose multiple ethnicities.				

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